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In a recent article on science and the law, Susan Haack suggested that
“we could learn something from the experiences of other nations that are
equally technologically advanced, but have different . . . legal
arrangements.” Her suggestion is both appropriate and timely, as the
evidence mounts on the problems with the current judicial management of
complex science.
This Article starts with a simple, related premise, that the proper
balance of legal process and scientific expertise is not a uniquely
American problem. If this is true, then we should, as Haack suggests,
seek inspiration for reform in the varying methodologies of other nations.
After beginning with a critical examination of the U.S. expert witness
system, this Article discusses the handling of expert witnesses in multiple
common law nations (Canada and the United Kingdom) and in multiple
civil law nations (Germany and Japan). After examining those systems,
this Article makes recommendations as to which methodologies, currently
in use and tested in those nations, offer the most promise in fixing the
weaknesses exposed in our system.
* Associate Professor of Law, Drake University Law School; J.D., University of
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wishes to thank the following reviewers for reading and/or commenting on an earlier version
of this work: Erica Beecher-Monas, Jagdeep Bhandari, David Caudill, Scott DeVito, Susan
Haack, John Langbein, Benjamin J. Priester, and Alan Williams. Leonardo Perez, Avery
Sander, and Bonnie Yamani provided research assistance to this project. Thanks also to
Katie, Clara, and Milo, without whom this Article would not have been possible.
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By reviewing the weaknesses in Daubert assessment of complex
expert testimony, how other nations handle similar evidence, and how
certain discrete areas of foreign law could address the weaknesses
identified in the U.S. approach, this Article offers reform alternatives to
assist judges in balancing the need for accuracy and reliability of the
science presented in court with the need to maintain our traditions of legal
process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The reception of foreign legal institutions is not a matter of
nationality, but of usefulness and need. No one bothers to fetch a
thing from afar when he has one as good or better at home, but
only a fool would refuse quinine just because it didn’t grow in his
back garden.
1
Rudolph von Jhering
As a necessity of modern tort litigation, expert witnesses commonly
2
Before the
present complex evidence for parties in litigation.
presentation of expert testimony at trial in a U.S. federal court, the
expert has already maneuvered through the essential preliminary steps:
the expert has been selected and retained by the party; assessed the
primary materials; issued a report; given deposition testimony; and may
have been evaluated for admissibility by the trial judge under the
3
Daubert standard. Many of these steps are intended to ensure the
reliability of the expert’s opinion.
However, in the most complex and detailed tort cases, researchers
and commentators have demonstrated significant problems and
4
weaknesses in the appraisal of scientific testimony under Daubert.
Even before the judge in a particular case addresses contested expert
issues, systematic concerns may threaten the truth-seeking function of
5
the proceeding. At the Daubert gatekeeping stage, the Federal Rules of
Evidence require judges to screen experts for reliability, yet research
suggests that judges often lack the skills to adequately assess the quality
6
of science presented in court. Even with this concern, tools intended to
1. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 17
(Tony Weir trans., 3d rev. ed. 1998) [hereinafter INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW]
(quoting Rudolph von Jhering).
2. As a class of cases, toxic torts demonstrate high reliance for, and necessity of, expert
witnesses. M. Neil Browne, Terri J. Keeley & Wesley J. Hiers, The Epistemological Role of
Expert Witnesses and Toxic Torts, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 1, 3 (1998).
3. FED. R. EVID. 702; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993);
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
4. See infra Parts II.B–.E.
5. See infra Parts II.B–.E.
6. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL
ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS 72 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989); Sophia I.
Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert
Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 442 (2001) (demonstrating
that judges were split on whether they had the necessary background to handle scientific
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provide judges with help in their gatekeeping functions are rarely used.7
In this environment, reform of the expert witness system is often
suggested but rarely implemented, while the judicial system maintains a
8
tolerance for the potential for inaccurate results. We can do better.
Striking the proper balance of scientific expertise and legal process is
not a uniquely American problem, and legal systems of other major
industrialized nations necessarily address the same issue. Even if legal
commentary may confine scholars within the intricacies of their own
legal system, legal reform efforts should—and often appropriately do—
9
consider alternative methods used by various legal systems. Combining
the understanding that expert witness issues are not uniquely American
with the idea that other nations offer alternatives, we can conclude that
other major nations of the world may be able to supply methods to
10
correct the problems of the American expert witness system.
This Article will assess various approaches to balancing legal due
process with the necessity of scientific expertise in modern tort
litigation. In doing so, the role of expert witnesses within two nations of

evidence in their courtroom); Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J.L.
& POL’Y 19, 19–20 (2007); Richard Lempert, Befuddled Judges: Statistical Evidence in Title
VII Cases, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT app. 2, at 263, 278 (Bernard
Grofman ed., 2000); see also infra Part II.D.1.
7. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas S. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a Role
for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1004–05 &
tbl.1 (1994); Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns
Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309, 326
tbl.5 (2002); see also discussion infra Part II.E.
8. On the issue of the cyclical nature of reform efforts, see Edward K. Cheng, Same Old,
Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past and Present, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1387, 1392–1400 (2005)
(reviewing TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE: THE HISTORY OF
SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (2004)) (chronicling several
recurring reform suggestions, from 1860 to the present era). Regarding the system’s “extreme
tolerance for low-accuracy results” when dealing with science, see Harold L. Korn, Law, Fact,
and Science in the Courts, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1080, 1115 (1966).
9. On comparative law as a fertile area for reform, see ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 9, 17 (2d ed. 1993); Bradley Bryan,
Justice and Advantage in Civil Procedure: Langbein’s Conception of Comparative Law and
Procedural Justice in Question, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 521, 537–39 (2004); Basil
Markesinis, Comparative Law—A Subject in Search of an Audience, 53 MOD. L. REV. 1, 21
(1990).
10. See generally David Kinley & Alan Rose, The Quest for the Truth: A Comparative
Analysis of the Role of Experts in Litigation, 31 AUS. J. FORENSIC SCI. 5, 16 (1999); John H.
Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United States, 43 AM. J. COMP. L.
545, 552 (1995) [hereinafter Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure].
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the common law family—Canada11 and the United Kingdom12—will be
reviewed, followed by an assessment of the civil law tradition in
13
14
Germany and Japan. This Article will identify those methodologies
15
currently in use within other legal systems that offer the most promise
16
for solving problems identified within our own system. Borrowing
from other national systems addressing similar concerns, this Article
proposes significant changes to the Daubert regime in order to promote
reliability and preserve legal process.
To achieve these aims, this Article begins by examining the
problems faced by judges in the United States when applying the
Daubert test for scientific admissibility, focusing, in Part II, on empirical
assessments of judicial perception of that system and its weaknesses.
Then, in Part III, it will shift from the issues posed by expert witnesses in
the United States to a discussion of comparative methodology in
general, involving the theory behind comparison of different nations’
systems. Next, Part IV will describe the rules, methods, and limits of
expertise in legal systems of other major industrialized nations, both in
common law and in civil law traditions. Finally, in Part V, this Article
will assess specific areas of expert witness law from other nations that
could address the weaknesses of the Daubert regime identified in Part
II.
By reviewing the perceived weaknesses in the assessment of expert
testimony in complex tort cases under Daubert, and examining how
certain aspects of foreign law could address the weaknesses identified in
the U.S. approach, this Article will offer suggestions for legal reform to
assist judges in balancing the need for reliability of the science presented
in court, with the need to maintain our key traditions of legal process.
II. EXPERT WITNESS MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
In her recent article Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled
Marriage of Science and Law, Susan Haack assessed the current state of
11. See infra Part IV.A.
12. See infra Part IV.B.
13. See infra Part IV.D.
14. See infra Part IV.E.
15. See infra Part V.B.
16. As one commentator notes, “[i]f law is a means to an end, then it is something we
can alter to fit our needs.” Bryan, supra note 9, at 554. As such, we can consider those
institutions which accomplish things in various polities as rich “techniques for . . .
understand[ing] differing ways to approach problems.” Id. at 538.
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complex science in the legal system, and concluded: “Maybe we could
learn something from the experiences of other countries that are equally
technologically advanced, but have different regulatory and legal
arrangements; certainly, we would do well to approach these problems
17
A
in a more empirical, experimental—a more scientific—spirit.”
detailed review of other nations’ approaches to the issue of complex
science, responding in part to Haack’s suggestion, forms much of the
18
latter half of this Article. However, it is appropriate to first consider
systematic constraints that create an environment where the validity and
reliability of science presented in complex litigation may be in question.
A. The Background and Basics of Daubert
Since the 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
federal judges screen contested expert evidence for admissibility under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, by assessing both its relevance to the case
19
In the Daubert
and the reliability of the scientific methodology.
decision itself, the Justices were not entirely in agreement on the ability
of federal judges to assess the reliability of expert methodologies.
Writing for the seven-vote majority, Justice Blackmun expressed
confidence in the federal judiciary’s ability to weigh competing
methodologies of science, pronouncing that “[w]e are confident that
20
In
federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this review.”
dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, while affirming his confidence in
federal judges, questioned whether they would be able to apply the
majority’s unclear standard, and deplored their being asked “to become
21
amateur scientists.” Almost immediately after the Daubert decision,
there was debate regarding both the merits of judicial screening for
scientific reliability and about the feasibility of judicial assessment of
22
scientific merit.
17. Susan Haack, Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage of Science and
Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2009, at 1, 23.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). After the 2000
amendments, Rule 702 requires reliability screening. FED. R. EVID. 702.
20. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
21. Id. at 601 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
22. Shortly after Daubert was issued in June 1993, articles assessed the impact of the
decision on admissibility, debating the merits of the post-Frye evidentiary standard. See, e.g.,
Bert Black, Francisco J. Ayala & Carol Saffran-Brinks, Science and the Law in the Wake of
Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 745–50, 786–800
(1994); Susan R. Poulter, Daubert and Scientific Evidence: Assessing Evidentiary Reliability in
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Before offering details of that debate, let me provide a brief
overview of the screening process required by Daubert. The first
requirement for any proposed expert evidence is that it be relevant to a
23
contested issue in the case. Relevance required no other definition,
according to the Court’s opinion in Daubert, than the “fit” of the
24
expertise to the case. On the issue of reliability, however, the Court
provided guidelines to help courts assess the methodological soundness
25
Justice Blackmun gave a nonof the proposed expert testimony.
exhaustive list of several factors that courts might consider in ensuring
the reliability of scientific methodologies, including: “whether [the
method] can be (and has been) tested,” peer review, “known or
potential rate of error,” and general acceptance within the scientific
26
community. As the Supreme Court later observed, federal judges can
thereby ensure that the expert “employs in the courtroom the same
level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in
27
the relevant field.”
With these guidelines after Daubert, federal judges must assess the
methodological soundness of proposed expert testimony before deciding
whether to admit it. From the beginning, on the remand in Daubert
itself, Judge Kozinski characterized the reliability assessment as
28
“daunting.” The quality of judicial screening of complex science—and
of the scientific evidence in general—presented in federal courtrooms
29
remains controversial.
To assess the Daubert framework, and to evaluate its weakness, this
Article will focus on a particular type of complex case—namely, the
large civil damages case in federal court dependent on scientific
Toxic Tort Litigation, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 1307, 1320–35 (evaluating the impacts, meanings,
and uncertainties of the Daubert decision); Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The
Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 64–68 (1993);
Symposium, The Impact of Science and Technology on the Courts, 43 EMORY L.J. 853 (1994)
(symposium dedicated to science and technology, with a focus on Daubert).
23. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 591.
24. Id. at 591.
25. Id. at 593–94.
26. Id.
27. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
28. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir.
1995).
29. For example, commentary regarding varying specialties, including high tech/IP law,
environmental disputes, forensic science, and epidemiology, is discussed in Andrew W. Jurs,
Science Court: Past Proposals, Current Considerations, and a Suggested Structure, 15 VA. J.L.
& TECH. 1, 23–24 (2010); see also infra Part II.D.2.
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evidence for proof of the claims or defenses.30 While necessarily
31
excluding some facets of the Daubert system, this focus will permit
assessment of several important criticisms of the current system.
If we want the judicial system to yield accurate results, there are
several concerns about the current structure of expert selection and
review that merit attention. One concern is selection bias—namely, the
selection of partisan or outlying experts by litigators to support a pre32
conceived position on the science. A second concern is the effect of
legal methodology—the due process adversarial model—on the
33
presentation of scientific materials in court. A third concern is the
issue raised in Daubert by the disagreement between Justice Blackmun
and Chief Justice Rehnquist: the ability of lay judges to handle
34
assessment of scientific methodologies. Finally, current procedures to
help judges in their Daubert review, as a check on the difficulties
35
resulting from selection and adversarial biases, remain largely unused.
B. Selection Bias
Problems with the current adversarial model in complex litigation
begin at the earliest stages of the expert involvement, from the bias
inherent in partisan selection of experts. Partisan selection bias is not a
problem created by Daubert; it existed well before the turn of the last

30. This subset is likely to have scientific issues that are fully litigated, contested, and
case dispositive. Therefore, they provide detailed judicial assessment of complex science,
allowing for detailed review of judicial management of those scientific issues. See supra note
2 and accompanying text. Regarding factors that could result in science being the dispositive
issue in a case, see Jurs, supra note 29, at 30–31 (listing factors to consider for jurisdictional
grant to one central “science court”).
31. Of course, many important cases assessing complex science under a Rule 702
reliability standard occur in state courts. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., v. Havner, 953
S.W.2d 706, 711, 714 (Tex. 1997) (noting that it was not the first court to address these issues
and providing the factors for evaluating expert opinion evidence); In re Lockheed Litig.
Cases, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762, 774–78 (Ct. App. 2005). In addition, the issue of applying the
Daubert standard in criminal prosecutions has gained attention following a recent report on
forensics by the National Academy of Sciences. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., COMM. ON
IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 95–110 (2009) (“The present situation,
however, is seriously wanting, both because of the limitations of the judicial system and
because of the many problems faced by the forensic science community.”).
32. See infra Part II.B.
33. See infra Part II.C.
34. See infra Part II.D.
35. See infra Part II.E.
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century.36 However, under Daubert, the problem gained additional
attention, as the standard for admission changed from “general
acceptance” under Frye—necessitating a review of the expert’s opinion
37
as compared to the consensus of the overall field —to the gatekeeping
38
In this analysis,
relevance and reliability standard of Rule 702.
selection bias will be characterized in terms of two related but distinct
problems: the problem of outlier enhancement and the problem of the
professional witness in the marketplace of persuasion. If reliability or
validity of scientific testimony are desired ends, then each type of
selection bias causes distinct difficulties with the expert witness role
39
under the present rules.
Outlier enhancement occurs when a litigant selects an expert witness
outside the mainstream of the discipline. The reason why an expert is
categorized as “outside the mainstream” varies. Some experts remain
outliers because they use non-standard methodology inconsistent with
40
the mainstream of the field. Other experts may use traditional and
accepted methodologies, but the conclusions they draw are outside
41
mainstream thinking in the field. Haack notes that parties have an
incentive to pick an expert “ready to accept an answer to some scientific
question as warranted when others in the field still remain agnostic,”
and that once an expert has testified repeatedly, a hesitant or nuanced

36. Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets Bias
and Deference, 77 OR. L. REV. 59, 65–70 (1998) (reviewing nineteenth century expert witness
issues).
37. The Frye analysis required federal judges to review the expert’s opinion as compared
to the consensus of the overall field. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)
(articulating “general acceptance” standard).
38. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (describing the
Frye general acceptance test: “That austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the
Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials”).
39. Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 182 (2010)
(accuracy of outcomes intrinsically and instrumentally beneficial).
40. The unusual methodology may result from an ideological commitment to alternative
methods. See Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66
BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1133 (2001). Or it could form from a subjective judgment leaning
toward one side or the other. See David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and
the (Partial) Failure of the Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 456–57 (2008).
41. See generally Haack, supra note 17, at 16–18. These experts are often selected
exactly due to their willingness to “incline” toward one or the other position. See Bernstein,
supra note 40, at 456 (explaining that “experts are selected ‘according as their opinion is
known to incline’” (quoting Abinger v. Ashton, [1873] 17 L.R.Eq. 358, 374 (U.K.))); Joseph
Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1577 (2007) [hereinafter Sanders,
Expert Witness Ethics].
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opinion can harden from “initially more cautious attitudes into
42
unwarranted certainty.” Sanders describes this phenomenon in his
assessment of the decades-long Bendectin litigation, where expert
43
opinion simplified over time to reduce uncertainty. Outlying experts
may offer sincere but idiosyncratic positions.
The genuine experts outside the mainstream serve as one type of
outlier enhancement, which is in contrast to those experts with
44
“conscious bias” or who have succeeded in the professional-witness
marketplace solely as a result of their persuasive force and ability to
45
convey certainty. Conscious bias may result from loyalty to a client
46
that retains the expert, or result from the expert’s metamorphosis over
47
time to fit the needs of the professional witness market. In her work
on expert problems, Jennifer Mnookin identifies one source of
professional witness bias in the competition for expert witness services
48
to meet the needs of the partisan client. As a result of competition
within that market, the experts most likely to be repeatedly retained
“will often not be those with the most knowledge or actual expertise in a
particular area, but rather those whom parties believe will succeed in
49
As a result, these experts become
persuading the factfinder.”
marketable by “being a ‘team player,’ and telling potential employers
50
(that is, parties) what they want to hear.” Independent of the expert
witness marketplace, the mere fact of payment alone could also result in
51
expert bias.
Outlier enhancement, by itself, may not be a concern—who can
blame partisans for partisanship?—until its effects on the adjudication
of disputes are measured. Under the current Federal Rules, the outlier
enhancement problem has enormous potential to affect litigation
42.
43.
44.
45.

Haack, supra note 17, at 17; see also Robertson, supra note 39, at 186–87.
Sanders, supra note 22, at 37.
Bernstein, supra note 40, at 454–55.
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73
BROOK. L. REV. 1009, 1011–12 (2008).
46. Bernstein, supra note 40, at 454–55; Mnookin, supra note 45, at 1010–11; Robertson,
supra note 39, at 185; Sanders, supra note 22, at 37; Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 40, at
1133.
47. See generally Mnookin, supra note 45, at 1011–12 (explaining the phenomenon of
“professional” expert witnesses).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1011.
50. Id. at 1012.
51. Robertson, supra note 39, at 188 (discussing the bias effect of compensation).
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outcomes. Experts become necessary when there are factual issues that
the factfinder is unable to decide without the assistance of specialized
52
knowledge. A judge or jury hearing the testimony of the outlying
53
expert is therefore peculiarly unable to assess its meaning in context.
As a result, testimony by outlying experts puts the reliability of results at
54
risk.
While outlier enhancement is a serious concern, particularly with
complex expert evidence beyond the ability of a layperson to weigh, it is
only one of several serious shortcomings of the current system under
Daubert. Indeed, if the selection bias issue could be remedied by the
parties, through the adversarial process or by the court, it would be
easily cured and not affect outcome reliability. As discussed infra,
however, neither of these two potential remedies succeeds.
C. Adversarial Methodology Bias
Selection bias would not threaten the reliability of outcomes if the
adversarial process effectively screened away unreliable outliers—
professional witnesses, and other patently biased testimony—from
reliable, appropriate testimony. In the area of scientific or expert
testimony, however, the adversarial method does not seem well-suited
55
to achieve this end.
Joseph Sanders criticizes current adversarial methods by declaring
that they “might as well have been designed to confuse, to leave the
audience staring at an unresolved and apparently unresolvable

52. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702.
53. Mnookin, supra note 45, at 1012; see also Deason, supra note 36, at 92–93; Sanders,
supra note 22, at 38–39.
54. See Bernstein, supra note 40, at 457 (noting that the “jury will receive a false sense
that the issue is a very close one”); Haack, supra note 17, at 17 (stating that the adversarial
process may create “artificial scientific doubt, or artificial scientific certainty” (footnote
omitted)); Mnookin, supra note 45, at 1012 (stating that the “marketplace for experts cannot
. . . be trusted to produce reliable information”); Robertson, supra note 39, at 181 (discussing
the “truth-deficit in litigation”); Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, supra note 41, at 1578 (noting
that “[f]ew deny the biasing effect of present arrangements”); Sanders, supra note 22, at 37
(noting that “[p]ersuasiveness is not always a useful indicator of truth”); see also Vidmar &
Diamond, supra note 40, at 1135–1167 (reviewing research into lay jurors and their
understanding of complex expert testimony).
55. The criticism of the adversarial method for scientific or expert witness disputes
contrasts with the common assumption that “cross-examination” is the “‘greatest legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth.’” Robertson, supra note 39, at 189 (quoting
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
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conflict.”56 John Langbein agrees, stating further that “[s]hort of
forbidding the use of experts altogether, we probably could not have
designed a procedure better suited to minimize the influence of
57
expertise.” This is not a concern that arose from Daubert, since it
58
existed before the turn of the last century. But it became particularly
troubling when the admissibility standard changed from Frye to Rule
59
702, resulting in a new era of judicial gatekeeping for reliability.
The potential for adversarial methods to affect reliability
assessments has received much attention and study in recent years,
particularly with analysis of the issue of cross-examination. Research on
the effect cross-examination “dirty tricks” have on reliability
determinations serves as an example of the concern. Kassin, Williams,
and Saunders tested the effect of cross-examination questions
containing a negative presumption on a mock jury’s perception of expert
60
credibility. The test involved a rape trial, in which a cross-examining
attorney asked a question that implied the expert’s research was poorly
61
regarded by colleagues or had been sharply criticized. The question
resulted in one of three responses: an admission, a denial, or an
62
objection by opposing counsel and a withdrawal of the question. The
researchers evaluated credibility scores for the expert given by the mock
jurors, and the data indicated that, regardless of the response to the
question and even in cases involving denial or withdrawal of the
question, the negative implication of the presumptive question harmed
63
expert credibility. This remained true even though the jurors also
reported that they did not believe the negative fact contained within the
64
As a result, the researchers note that
presumptive question.
presumptive questions are regularly employed, and that “this study
56. Sanders, supra note 22, at 41 (quoting Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS.
L. REV. 1113, 1175.
57. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
823, 836 (1985) [hereinafter Langbein, The German Advantage].
58. Ryan M. Seidemann et al., Closing the Gate on Questionable Expert Witness
Testimony: A Proposal to Institute Expert Review Panels, 33 S.U. L. REV. 29, 67 (2005).
59. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
60. Saul M. Kassin, Lorri N. Williams & Courtney L. Saunders, Dirty Tricks of CrossExamination: The Influence of Conjectural Evidence on the Jury, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
373, 373–74 (1990).
61. Id. at 376.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 380–81.
64. Id.
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suggests that the use of presumptuous questions is a dirty trick that can
65
be used to distort jurors’ evaluations of a witness’s credibility.” So in
cases of presumptive questions, at least, empirical study indicates that
inappropriate cross-examination may have a dramatic effect on
factfinders’ perceptions of expert witnesses.
The problem of adversarial cross-examination techniques, however,
cannot be confined to inappropriate presumptive questions or to dirty
tricks alone. Rather, the basic procedure seems to be inconsistent with
reasoned assessment of complex scientific material. Several aspects of
cross-examination suggest that reliability may be affected by the
standard methodologies of cross-examination.
First, cross-examination imposes on the opposing advocate a duty to
66
find, explore, and even create doubt about an expert’s opinions. This
67
duty remains “even if the advocate knows the testimony is accurate.”
As a result, vigorous cross-examination, even of accurate testimony,
may create an artificial “impression of conflict even when little or no
68
disagreement exists in practice.” To avoid acknowledging weakness on
cross, an expert may shade his or her testimony to the benefit of the
69
client in order to eliminate or reduce doubts about the testimony.
Empirical research shows this effect to be pervasive. In one study,
seventy-seven percent of experts agreed with the statement, “Lawyers
manipulate their experts to weaken unfavorable testimony and
70
A majority also agreed that
strengthen favorable testimony.”
“[l]awyers urge their experts to be less tentative” than they otherwise
71
would. As a result, expert testimony may convey an artificial and
unwarranted certainty. This can profoundly affect the perception of the
reliability of complex scientific testimony.
65. Id. at 382.
66. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Arts of Persuasion in Science and Law: Conflicting
Norms in the Courtroom, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2009, at 41, 50 (finding that “a
party may shape and select evidence to its benefit”).
67. Id. at 50 n.46 (emphasis removed).
68. Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 32
JURIMETRICS J. 345, 353–54 (1992); see also Joseph Sanders, Science, Law, and the Expert
Witness, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2009, at 63, 67–68 [hereinafter Sanders, Science,
Law, and Expert Witness].
69. Cheng, supra note 8, at 1392 (suggesting that “even a scrupulous expert will shade
his testimony in his party’s favor”); Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, supra note 41, at 1577.
70. Daniel W. Shuman, Elizabeth Whitaker & Anthony Champagne, An Empirical
Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in the Courts—Part II: A Three City Study, 34
JURIMETRICS J. 193, 201 tbl.3 (1994).
71. Id.
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Second, cross-examination often results in formulaic attack
unrelated to the evidence in question. In his study of the expert
testimony in the Bendectin cases, Sanders reported that expert crossexamination often revolved around the assertion that the expert witness
fees made an expert a hired gun willing to say anything for the right
72
price. In addition, the cross can involve minute distinctions between
deposition testimony and trial testimony, which “rarely involve[]
fundamental discrepancies that . . . significantly jeopardize the
73
witnesses’ direct testimony.” Even though it is unhelpful in assisting
74
the trier on the merits, this kind of cross-examination seems common.
If cross-examination in these areas—attacking credibility on the
basis of fees or small discrepancies—is universal, commentators suggest
75
it has the effect of lowering overall systematic effectiveness. In this
model, cross-examination is merely a “ritual that does little to clarify the
76
strengths and weaknesses of a witness’ testimony.”
Haack also suggests that the procedures of the adversarial method,
and the legal standards of Daubert, combine to reduce expert testimony
to a few “brief verbal formulae” that carry disproportionate weight in
77
the legal world, beyond their meaning in the scientific community. As
one example, Haack notes that, in the scientific community, “peer
78
review,” is not synonymous with “reliable.” However, peer review is
used by lawyers as one indicator of reliable science, because Justice
Blackmun in Daubert listed it as a specific factor to consider in
79
reliability assessments. Haack points out that scientific concepts may
diverge from their original meaning when used in a legal context, with a
80
Reliability can be
potential to affect the reliability of the results.
affected by adversarial methods, in particular cross-examination, which
may feed an expert’s incentive to reduce uncertainty, shade testimony,
or modify concepts beyond their scientific scope into legal buzzwords.
So, experts tend to become mouthpieces for the parties who retain
them, reducing uncertainty, eliminating nuance, and adopting the
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Sanders, supra note 22, at 47.
Id. at 48.
See Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 836 (citations omitted).
Id.
Sanders, supra note 22, at 47.
Haack, supra note 17, at 19.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993)).
Id. (discussing further the issue of “statistical significance”).
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language of the legal method—rather than the scientific one—in
81
In this system, the factfinder may
presenting their conclusions.
ultimately conclude that all experts are biased and confused, and thus
82
With no principled way to decide between the
discount them all.
experts, jurors could decide on other factors rather than scientific
83
As a result, jury verdicts may not reflect a principled
validity.
assessment of merit, but instead serve a different, outcome-approving
purpose, providing a pre-packaged justification for whichever verdict or
84
decision the decisionmaker wishes to reach.
Adversarial procedure may undermine the reliability of complex
scientific evidence. This concern is accentuated when adversarial bias
and selection bias combine in a single case. Yet if alternative—rather
than adversarial—legal processes provided an effective final check on
reliability, then reliability might be less impacted. Instead of allowing a
jury decision based on unreliable expertise, the judge may instead
85
ensure reliability through vigorous vetting of all science. So even in a
world of selection bias and adversarial methodology, a strong
gatekeeping system could save reliability by ensuring that only truly
86
Of course, that
appropriate scientific evidence will be considered.
requires an active judicial role and skilled judicial intervention.
D. Judicial Inexperience with Issues Central to Daubert Review
Underlying the Daubert gatekeeping structure lies an optimistic

81. See Sanders, supra note 22, at 38. Regarding the distinctions between legal
factfinding and the scientific method, see Haack, supra note 17, at 7–15; Sanders, Science,
Law, and Expert Witness, supra note 68, at 70–73. See generally Sander Greenland, The Need
for Critical Appraisal of Expert Witnesses in Epidemiology and Statistics, 39 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 291, 292–94 (2004) (explaining the conflict between scientific values of uncertainty and
the limited time available for courts and attorneys).
82. Robertson, supra note 39, at 192; Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, supra note 41, at
1578 (“It is also likely that biased testimony contributes to the dilution effects by causing
jurors to undervalue all expert opinions.”).
83. Robertson, supra note 39, at 192 (suggesting that “factfinders may also resort to
more-or-less irrelevant proxies for the truth”); Sanders, supra note 22, at 38–39.
84. Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, supra note 41, at 1578 (quoting a juror in an asbestos
case—“The expert testimony was not a real factor in our decision, except in the very
backhanded senses that it lent medical credence to any result” (quoting Jane Goodman et al.,
What Confuses Jurors in Complex Cases, TRIAL, Nov. 1985, at 65, 68)).
85. Regarding jurors relying on proxies for decisionmaking during a battle-of-the
experts, see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
86. See Robertson, supra note 39, at 189 (finding that the current system “allows judges
to exclude the most biased experts”); Seidemann et al., supra note 58, at 68.
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assumption about judicial skill in handling complex scientific evidence
87
The
and distinguishing between better and worse scientific work.
capacity of judges to handle this task has been the subject of major
debate since 1993, but it is clear that Daubert reliability testing requires
judges to critically assess the quality of proffered evidence and make
88
judgments on scientific merit.
Part of the concern is that judges necessarily evaluate the reliability
of particular scientific methodologies as performed by scientific
89
experts, but most judges have little, if any, training in any scientific
90
Recent empirical research demonstrates that judicial
discipline.
inexperience with scientific theory, and with statistics involved in many
research fields, may threaten the ability of judges to do this
91
successfully; judges “often lack the tools or expertise to make well92
informed decisions.”
If judges lack appropriate scientific literacy, their ability to perform
93
their gatekeeping role successfully remains in doubt. Empirical data
94
suggest these problems can affect admissibility decisions.
1. Judges and Their Scientific Background, Use of Statistics
Empirical study in the area of judges’ backgrounds in—and their
capacity to undertake review of—scientific and statistical principles casts
doubt on the assumption that judges will be able to adequately assess
87. See supra Part II.A and notes 19–22, 27 and accompanying text.
88. David S. Caudill, Lawyers Judging Experts: Oversimplifying Science and
Undervaluing Advocacy to Construct an Ethical Duty?, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 675, 683 (2011).
89. See Michel F. Baumeister & Dorothea M. Capone, Admissibility Standards as
Politics—The Imperial Gate Closers Arrive!!!, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1025, 1040 (2003)
(quoting Samuel H. Jackson, Comment, Technical Advisors Deserve Equal Billing with Court
Appointed Experts in Novel and Complex Scientific Cases: Does the Federal Judicial Center
Agree?, 28 ENVTL. L. 431, 436 (1998)).
90. Id. at 1040–41(referencing the survey results from Gatowski et al., supra note 6, at
442).
91. See Gatowski et al., supra note 6, at 433–44, 450–55.
92. Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L.J.
1263, 1268 (2007); see also Stephen Breyer, Introduction to FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 1, 4 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter REFERENCE MANUAL
ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE] (“[M]ost judges lack the scientific training that might facilitate the
evaluation of scientific claims or the evaluation of expert witnesses who make such claims.”).
93. Gatowski et al., supra note 6, at 454.
94. Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the
Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 926–31 (2003) (citations
omitted) (identifying, but scrutinizing, recent empirical research and independent evaluation
of the effect of judicial background on admissibility decisions).
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underlying scientific methodologies of experts.
Research shows that most judges have not had extensive
95
mathematical or scientific training. In her 2007 study, Valerie Hans
assessed the skill of judges handling expert testimony on mitochondrial
96
DNA presented in a hypothetical case. The study first demonstrates
that the judges’ educational background in math and science was similar
97
to that of the general jury pool. Indeed, compared to the subset of
jurors who had college degrees, judges had significantly fewer courses in
98
math and science in their educational backgrounds. Moreover, when
compared to those jurors whose work involved math or science, Hans
found the general pool of judges again had completed fewer classes in
99
the relevant fields. Finally, this study also showed that those judges
who have the most exposure to math and science in their judicial work
are not necessarily those who are the most trained in math and
100
science.
While educational background is one concern, Hans also studied
whether educational weakness translates into poor application of
scientific principles. Hans’s judges assessed expert testimony involving
101
mitochondrial DNA, and after they were shown a videotape of
testimony from a mock trial regarding DNA, Hans asked the judges to
102
complete eleven true–false questions about the testimony. She found
that the judges outperformed the overall jury pool on two questions,
103
while the general jury pool did slightly better on one. However, the
college-educated jury pool scored higher than the judges on three of the

95. See Hans, supra note 6, at 28–31.
96. Id. at 28–29. Her study sample included sixty-five judges who volunteered to
participate after Dr. Hans’s presentation at a “Science for Judges” conference. Id. at 28.
These responses were then compared to volunteer jury pool participants selected from New
Castle County, Delaware. Id. at 27, 29–31.
97. Id. at 30 (noting that judges reported an average of 10.29 classes in high school and
college, compared to 9.72 for the jury pool).
98. Id. (noting that college-educated juror subsets averaged 14.04 classes in science and
math, compared to the 10.29 classes for judges).
99. Id. at 31.
100. Id. (concluding that “the judges who said they encountered ‘a great deal’ of
scientific evidence in their judicial work did not report having more of a science and math
background”).
101. Id. at 31–38 (explaining and assessing judge and jury comprehension of expert
testimony, based on questionnaire data).
102. Id. at 36.
103. Id. at 36–37.
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eleven questions, while the judges scored higher on only one.104 Hans’s
study demonstrates that judges perform worse than college-educated
jurors in analyzing scientific evidence, which suggests that their capacity
to perform their gatekeeping function is questionable.
A second study, performed by Sophia Gatowski and her colleagues
in 2001, assessed judicial knowledge of basic scientific principles
105
involved in Daubert gatekeeping. Initially, Gatowski’s study assessed
the judges’ background in science, and reported that judges themselves
are split on whether they have adequate background to prepare them
106
for their analyses of science in the courtroom. When asked about the
Daubert factors—falsifiability, error rate, peer review and publication,
and general acceptance—a large majority of judges agreed that those
107
However, the
factors were useful in assessing expert evidence.
judges—who as a group agreed these concepts were useful in
determining admissibility for expert evidence—were largely unable to
provide a proper definition for the factors of falsifiability and error
108
rate. Based on the data, Gatowski and her colleagues concluded that
“although judges overwhelmingly endorse the active gatekeeping role
defined by Daubert, many may lack the scientific literacy necessitated by
109
Daubert.”
Empirical research in the area of statistics shows similar results. In
his 1982 assessment of judges’ handling of statistical data, Dr. Stephen
Fienberg reports that “[p]erhaps the most difficult task facing the courts
is the evaluation and assessment of statistical analyses and opinions,
110
especially in cases where there is conflicting statistical testimony.”
After review of cases involving statistical data, Fienberg concluded that
the resolution of conflicts between experts in statistical issues is clearly
104. Id. at 37–38.
105. Gatowski et al., supra note 6, at 438.
106. Id. at 442 (finding that 52% said background adequately prepared them for the
range of scientific evidence in court and that 48% said background inadequately prepared
them).
107. Id. at 444–47 (finding that 88%, 91%, 92%, and 93% reported each concept useful,
respectively).
108. Id. at 444, 447 (concluding that 6% of responses showed an understanding of
falsifiability and 4% showed an understanding of error rate). But cf. id. at 447–48 (finding
that 71% of responses showed an understanding of peer review and 82% showed an
understanding of general acceptance).
109. Id. at 453–54.
110. Stephen E. Fienberg, The Increasing Sophistication of Statistical Assessments as
Evidence in Discrimination Litigation, 77 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 784, 786 (1982).
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“beyond the ken of even the most thoughtful and well-trained jurist.”111
The National Research Council, in 1989, suggested the same in their
112
assessment of the handling of statistical evidence in six case studies.
So even before Daubert, commentators expressed concern over
statistical assessment by judges. Since Daubert, empirical research
demonstrates that concerns over judicial skill in handling of statistics are
113
not unfounded.
Since statistics are essential to understanding the underlying
methodological choices in many types of empirical research,
unfamiliarity with the methods of statistical research can directly affect
114
A brief examination of a
Daubert gatekeeping reliability choices.
particular field dependent on statistical analysis—epidemiologic
evidence—demonstrates the practical effect of this concern over judicial
115
training and handling of complex evidence.
2. Review of Judicial Handling of Complex Expert Testimony:
Epidemiologic Risk and the Daubert Standard
Epidemiology involves the study of “incidence, distribution, and
etiology of disease in human populations,” and is often involved in
attempting to show that disease is caused by certain substances or
116
Assessment of the relationship between exposure and the
toxins.
111. Id. at 787.
112. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 74 (“The case studies reveal that in
dealing with statistical evidence courts can face substantial problems of institutional
competence.”).
113. See CARL F. CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF
JUSTICE 291–92 (2006) (stating that judges are not trained and lack the correct background to
assess science done by the experts in the area); DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE
USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW 53–54 (1999) (“In most areas of the law, those
using science have little or no training in the subject. This is true for judges, jurors,
legislators, and to a lesser extent, administrators.”); Lempert, supra note 6, at 278.
114. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Empirical Research Methods: Using Empirical
Research in Law and Policy, 81 NEB. L. REV. 777, 797 (2002) (“Those without a basic
understanding of methods will be less likely to be able to identify the benefits of a particular
methodological approach and will not be attuned to the drawbacks of the approach.”).
115. Andrew Jurs, Judicial Analysis of Complex & Cutting-Edge Science in the Daubert
Era: Epidemiologic Risk Assessment as a Test Case for Reform Strategies, 42 CONN. L. REV.
49, 69–80 (2009). For more detail regarding this field of study, see id. at 53–69.
116. Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 92, at 333, 335 (defining epidemiology and
noting the use in proof of causation); see also Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin,
Reference Guide on Toxicology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra
note 92, at 401, 403 (defining toxicology as “‘the study of the adverse effects of chemicals on
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incidence of disease involves informed analysis of data regarding the
frequency of disease within the population, and multiple other factors,
117
including statistical analysis. As a result, statistics often play a crucial
role in establishing causation in cases involving epidemiologic
118
evidence.
In several studies of judges’ performance in evaluating complex
epidemiologic evidence, epidemiologists have rejected the conclusions
119
reached by judges in evaluating causation by using statistics on disease.
Epidemiologist Dr. Sander Greenland has sharply criticized the
handling of probability data by judicial gatekeepers assessing causation
120
evidence in toxic tort cases. He suggests that the courts’ focus on the
relative risk analysis in epidemiology—often to the exclusion of other
factors—oversimplifies the complexity of establishing causative effects
121
in epidemiology. In addition, Greenland noted that relative risk—or
incidence rate—will often be applied by courts in a manner beyond its
122
meaning within the field of epidemiology.
In a separate analysis of judicial handling of epidemiological
123
Beyea
evidence, Dr. Jan Beyea and Daniel Berger are also critical.
and Berger suggest, as Greenland did, that the courts’ assessment of risk
ratio to establish causation oversimplifies the process of establishing
living organisms’” (quoting David L. Eaton & Curtis D. Klaassen, Principles of Toxicology, in
CASARETT AND DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 13, 13 (Curtis D.
Klaassen et al. eds., 5th ed. 1996))).
117. Green et al., supra note 116, at 375–79 (defining nine factors to assess causation
relationship).
118. See id. at 348 (“An association between exposure to an agent and disease exists
when they occur together more frequently than one would expect by chance.”). See generally
id. at 348–63, 369–73 (describing the use of statistics in epidemiology and potential sources of
error in statistical analysis).
119. Jan Beyea & Daniel Berger, Scientific Misconceptions Among Daubert
Gatekeepers: The Need for Reform of Expert Review Procedures, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring/Summer 2001, at 327, 348, 350–57 (explaining how Daubert has created “Judicial
Junk,” using the misapplication of the doubling-of-risk standard as an example); Sander
Greenland, Relation of Probability of Causation to Relative Risk and Doubling Dose: A
Methodologic Error That Has Become a Social Problem, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1166, 1169
(1999).
120. Greenland, supra note 119, at 1166–69.
121. Id. at 1166–68.
122. Id. at 1168–69 (explaining that the “discrepancy between the rate fraction and the
probability of causation has been overlooked by various experts in the legal as well as the
scientific community, even though it undermines the rationale for a number of current legal
standards”).
123. Beyea & Berger, supra note 119, at 349–50.
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causation in epidemiologic analysis.124 In addition, reliance on the risk
ratio provides an unrealistic standard of “pure objectivity” that contrasts
125
The problem is that
to other, necessarily more subjective, opinions.
nearly all opinions in the area require some level of subjectivity, “based
126
In so doing,
on past experience and best professional judgment.”
Beyea and Berger expose that judicial use of risk-ratio assessment in the
courtroom falls well short of epidemiological standards used in the work
127
of researchers. Thus, Daubert review aspires to ensure that scientists
bring the same level of intellectual rigor to the courtroom as in their
128
scientific work; but the previous discussion shows how far the courts
have fallen short of this goal.
3. Conclusion on Judicial Handling of Science
Considering the concerns regarding outlier enhancement and the
129
adversarial methodology in assessment of complex science in court,
judges must evaluate proffered evidence closely to ensure that expert
opinion evidence is based on reliable methods. However, to do so
requires a detailed understanding of the “subtleties of scientific
130
inquiry.”
Empirical assessment of judges’ background and ability to apply
basic scientific and statistical principles suggests that they are not well131
equipped for this task. Evaluation of the judicial handling of a specific
area of complex evidence—epidemiological evidence in toxic torts—
affirms this conclusion, as many epidemiologists reject the methodology
used by judges in Daubert assessments regarding evidence from their
132
field.
124. Id. at 353–55.
125. Id. at 355–56.
126. Id. at 356–57.
127. Id. at 355–57. See generally CRANOR, supra note 113, at 283 (“Admissibility
decisions should be better founded scientifically than at present and comport better with how
scientists themselves assess evidence.”).
128. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
129. See supra Parts II.B–.C.
130. Carl F. Cranor et al., Judicial Boundary Drawing and the Need for Content-Sensitive
Science in Toxic Torts After Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 16 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 1, 6 (1996); see also Baumeister & Capone, supra note 89, at 1039–41 (explaining that a
major criticism of the Daubert standard is that the judge may not be qualified to accurately
assess scientific evidence or methods).
131. Cheng, supra note 92, at 1270 & nn.17–18 (citing surveys and case law); Gatowski
et al., supra note 6, at 454; see also supra Part II.D.1.
132. Beyea & Berger, supra note 119, at 348–50, 353–57; Greenland, supra note 119, at
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With evidence demonstrating that judges lack the background to
assess reliability in many fields, judges may, in cases involving the most
complex and difficult science, require assistance. A judge might better
perform Daubert reliability assessments by either appointing a Rule 706
independent expert, or performing independent judicial research to
133
become more knowledgeable in the scientific field.
E. Current Unused Methodologies to Assist Judges
In General Electric v. Joiner, Justice Breyer wrote, in his
concurrence, that “judges are not scientists and do not have the
scientific training that can facilitate the making of such decisions” on
subtle and sophisticated matters of scientific methodology, as required
134
by Daubert. Justice Breyer suggested that judges consider using other
methodologies to assist them in the evaluation of scientific evidence,
135
including the use of independent experts under Rule 706. Breyer also
mentioned other ways judges can further their analysis, including
employing scientifically trained law clerks, more and more detailed Rule
136
16 pretrial conferences, and examination of experts by the court.
Unfortunately, these methodologies remain largely unused by
137
judges. This may threaten reliability of the outcomes reached within
the system, because, as Justice Breyer suggested, these tools may be
necessary to assist judges evaluating complex scientific evidence in the
138
most difficult cases.
1. Independent Judicial Research
One way for a judge to become a more knowledgeable gatekeeper is
for him or her to independently research into literature regarding the
scientific issue in controversy in a pending case. Even before Daubert,
commentators suggested independent judicial research as a method to

1166; see also supra Part II.D.2.
133. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, The Law’s Scientific Revolution: Reflections and
Ruminations on the Law’s Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 661, 669 (2000) (“Having an expert from the field to discuss the complexities of the
science greatly should improve judges’ comprehension of the research and relieve their fears
of making a holding or writing an opinion that delves deeply into the subject.”).
134. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 149–50 (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 149.
137. See infra Part II.E.
138. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 149 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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overcome judicial weakness in evaluating expert evidence.139 Those
140
Some also suggest that the
suggestions continue after Daubert.
research should extend beyond investigation into existing studies and
141
into the creation of new research in uncertain fields.
Evidence suggests that for many judges the active research role is
beyond their perception of the boundaries of the judicial role and
adversarial litigation. In his article Independent Judicial Research in the
Daubert Age, Edward Cheng evaluated judicial attitudes toward
142
When
independent research by surveying state appellate judges.
asked about independent consultation with a medical school professor
or a family physician to look into questions relevant to a pending case,
143
judges overwhelmingly rejected the idea. Judges were not as uniform
on independent library research, disagreeing about whether consulting a
144
medical journal or a medical treatise was appropriate. In conclusion,
Cheng suggested that “the drafters of the latest revision of the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct should explicitly authorize independent
research. Clarification of the evidentiary rules could be helpful as
145
well.” These changes would promote active judicial research.
Between the divergence of opinion on its desirability and the mixed
statutory and legal basis for judges to perform independent research
under current law, Cheng concludes that while independent judicial
146
research may be desirable, it remains unlikely to become either
147
mandatory or universal.
139. See, e.g., John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,
Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 497–98 (1986).
140. Cheng, supra note 92, at 1315.
141. Christine H. Kim, Essay, Piercing the Veil of Toxic Ignorance: Judicial Creation of
Scientific Research, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 540, 560, 582–83 (2007) (explaining that “it is time
for courts to take a more active role in creating research by using the tools they already have
at their disposal—most significantly, the authority to appoint neutral experts and the broad
equitable power to craft innovative remedies”).
142. Cheng, supra note 92, at 1275–76.
143. Id. at 1278 (finding that 89% of the judges found family physician consultation
undesirable and 88% found medical school professor consultation undesirable).
144. Id. at 1276, 1277 figs.1–2 (reporting that 25% of the judges said consulting a medical
journal was very undesirable and 21% said consulting a medical journal was very desirable,
whereas nearly 20% of the judges said consulting a medial treatise was very undesirable and
nearly 18% said consulting a medical treatise was very desirable).
145. Id. at 1285–86, 1302–03.
146. Id. at 1315.
147. Id. at 1277, 1312, 1314 (finding that (1) a significant percentage of judges see
independent research as very undesirable; (2) mandatory rules are unlikely to result in
universal behavior; and (3) a discretionary approach is consistent with the overall character of
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Independent judicial research could—if properly done—assist the
judge in overcoming some of the inherent problems with Daubert
gatekeeping, such as weak training in science or a poor ability to apply
148
scientific principles. But without additional use, it may not provide a
systematic solution to the Daubert gatekeeping weaknesses.
2. Independent Experts
The use of independent experts under Federal Rule of Evidence
149
706 provides one additional and often-suggested solution to the
150
problem of judicial inexperience with complex science. Yet empirical
research demonstrates that, similar to independent research, judges
151
As a result, the
remain reluctant to appoint independent experts.
suggestion of Justice Breyer in Joiner, to use different measures to assist
judges in evaluating complex science, goes largely unheeded.
There are, without question, multiple benefits to using independent
experts under Rule 706, particularly in the area of Daubert review.
Initially, a judge who lacks background training in science and math—as
152
research demonstrates many do —could call upon an independent
expert to provide a non-partisan analysis of the expert opinions and
153
This
methodology of the experts retained by the opposing parties.
could assist the judges in comporting their Daubert reliability decisions
to the state of current research in the field, beyond the opinions and
154
The judge could, with
research presented by partisan outliers.
assistance from the expert, see which party’s criticisms of the opposing
expert actually affect reliability—and thus admissibility under Daubert
screening—and which are merely adversarial attacks trying to create

the rules).
148. See supra Part II.D, notes 111–113 and accompanying text (judges lack scientific
training).
149. There is also some support for the idea that independent experts can be appointed
through a judge’s inherent ability to assess evidence under Rule 104. FED. R. EVID. 104(b);
Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 n.8 (D. Or. 1996) (using Rule 104,
not Rule 706, to appoint independent experts).
150. See Cheng, supra note 8, at 1393–96.
151. Krafka et al., supra note 7, at 326 tbl.5; see also Shirley A. Dobbin et al., Federal
and State Trial Judges on the Proffer and Presentation of Expert Evidence, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 1,
10 tbl.3 (2007).
152. See supra Part II.D.1.
153. For this reason, commentators see independent experts as a solution to many of
these problems. See supra Parts II.B–.D; see also Robbennolt, supra note 114, at 797.
154. See supra Part II.B (selection bias of experts favor outliers within field).

17 - JURS (DO NOT DELETE)

1354

7/9/2012 10:13 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[95:1329

artificial doubt.155 Finally, if the parties know the judge intends to
employ a neutral expert to help review reliability, parties are more likely
to initially offer an opinion within the mainstream of the field, to avoid
156
loss of evidence.
With these potential benefits, it is not surprising that empirical
research demonstrates that judges also view independent experts as
157
helpful. Two studies, one from 1989 and one from 1994, show that a
large majority of judges agree that an independent expert is likely to be
158
helpful in assessing cases. But even with the substantial agreement by
judges that independent experts may be beneficial, research also
demonstrates that few judges actually use them.
Two empirical studies published after Daubert show judicial
159
reluctance to use independent expert review. In their 1994 survey of
431 federal judges, Cecil and Willging assessed judges’ views about Rule
160
706 experts. Even though the judges overwhelmingly believed experts
161
could be helpful, very few had ever appointed an independent expert.
The survey shows that only about 20% of their sample—86 of 431
162
judges—had ever appointed an expert under Rule 706. Of those who
had appointed an independent expert, a majority had done so only
163
Of those who had appointed an independent expert, an
once.
164
overwhelming majority reported they were satisfied with the result.
The Cecil and Willging study results are consistent with the 2002
165
In the Krafka study, the
study by Carol Krafka and her colleagues.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 65–70.
156. Jurs, supra note 115, at 86 (citing Developments in the Law, Confronting the New
Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1590–91 (1995)).
157. See Cecil & Willging, supra note 7, at 995; Louis Harris & Associates, Inc., Judges’
Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and Federal Trial Judges Who Spend At
Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. REV. 731, 741 & tbl.3.6 (1989)
[hereinafter Harris].
158. Cecil & Willging, supra note 7, at 1009 (finding that 87% of the judges responded
that independent experts would be helpful); Harris, supra note 157, at 741 & tbl.3.6
(concluding that such support is held by 76% of federal judges and 70% of state judges).
159. Cecil & Willging, supra note 7, at 1005 tbl.1; Krafka et al., supra note 7, at 326 tbl.5.
160. Cecil & Willging, supra note 7, at 1004 n.33.
161. Id. at 1004, 1009.
162. Id. at 1004, 1005 tbl.1.
163. Id. at 1005 & tbl.1 (finding that 52% of the judges who had appointed an
independent expert only did so on one occasion).
164. Id. at 1008 (concluding that 63 of 65 judges were satisfied with their independent
experts).
165. See Krafka et al., supra note 7, at 326 tbl.5.
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judges surveyed rarely used independent experts.166 Only 26% of
167
That 26%
respondents had ever appointed an independent expert.
figure compared to the 41% who indicated they participated in
168
independent research, 64% who used pretrial hearings to define the
169
170
scope of expert testimony, or 77% who used Daubert hearings. Cecil
& Willging’s research and the Krafka study both demonstrate the
general picture of judicial unwillingness to use independent experts,
171
even if believed to be helpful.
If judges are reluctant to use a procedure they consider helpful,
there must be some reason for this. Cecil and Willging’s report suggests
several reasons why judges are reluctant to appoint an independent
expert, including adherence to the adversarial system, inability to
identify an expert, and desiring to limit Rule 706 for use in
172
Recent commentators agree with those
extraordinary cases only.
conclusions. Cheng believes judicial reluctance to appoint relates to
judicial inability to find the right expert, concerns about maintaining
173
adversarial procedures, and a desire to avoid case management delays.
Similarly, Robertson cites inability or difficulty in selecting and
174
preparing proper experts, and adversarial norms.
Despite agreement that independent experts offer solutions to many
of the problems of judicial review of scientific methodology under
Daubert, use of Rule 706 experts remains rare. As currently configured,
Rule 706 procedures fall short of their potential in assisting judges with
Daubert reliability assessments.

166. Id. at 326 tbl.5, 327.
167. See id. at 326 tbl.5.
168. See id.; see also Cheng, supra note 92, at 1276, 1277 figs.1–2 (detailing survey results
that many judges are unwilling to independently consult experts); supra notes 144–148 and
accompanying text.
169. Krafka et al., supra note 7, at 326 tbl.5.
170. Id. at 325–26 & tbl.5.
171. See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SPECIAL MASTERS’
INCIDENCE AND ACTIVITY: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE’S ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES AND ITS SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPECIAL MASTERS 16 (2000)
(stating that independent experts are utilized at a rate of 2.7 appointments per 10,000 cases).
172. Cecil & Willging, supra note 7, at 1015, 1018.
173. Cheng, supra note 92, at 1271–72.
174. Robertson, supra note 39, at 200.
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F. Conclusions Regarding Judicial Handling of Science in the Daubert
Era
The combined effects of the above difficulties suggest systematic
weakness in U.S. courts’ assessment of complex science, and so it is
appropriate to seek methods to resolve these concerns. In Legal
Transplants, Alan Watson suggested that, as a general matter, other
nations’ legal systems provide a natural source for law reform
175
methods. The foreign experience with science in litigation is a natural
place to find ways to improve our system, as Haack and others have
176
suggested.
III. PROCEDURES USED IN COMPARATIVE LAW ASSESSMENT
Having reviewed both the methods used by courts in the United
States to assess reliability of experts, and the problems of those
methods, the question remains how to resolve those concerns. An
examination of foreign systems provides insight into other tested
procedures to address these weaknesses. However, before jumping
directly into the foreign systems, one must first address the
methodological perspective to be employed.
There are many different, sometimes incompatible, approaches to
177
the study of comparative law. The differences are stark, occasionally
178
The
enough to affect the tenor of academic discourse in the field.
methods discussed in these arguments, and the criticisms thereof, offer
175. WATSON, supra note 9, at 17.
176. Haack, supra note 17, at 23; Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure,
supra note 10, at 552.
177. Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half
of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671, 686–90 (2002) (noting that “the subject
consists of a multitude of bits and pieces that do not add up to a coherent whole”).
178. Compare Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 823, and John H.
Langbein, Trashing The German Advantage, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 763, 764–65, 784 (1988)
(stating that the Allen et al. article misrepresents his previous work, and further calling its
response “thoroughly untrustworthy” and a “reckless trashing” of his work), with Ronald J.
Allen et al., The German Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea for More Details and Fewer
Generalities in Comparative Scholarship, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 705, 707–08, 761 (1988)
[hereinafter Allen et al., A Plea] (responding to 1985 Langbein article on experts in Germany
and stating, “We are also convinced, however, that to be useful comparative analysis must
proceed beyond platitudes and generalities to address instead the realities of the systems
being compared”), and Ronald J. Allen, Idealization and Caricature in Comparative
Scholarship, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 785, 807 (1988) [hereinafter Allen, Idealization and
Caricature] (stating that Langbein failed to respond to criticism of his work, but rather only
responded to discredit critics).
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insight into proper methodological choices for analysis of experts.
As a starting point, the traditional approach to comparative analysis
is functionalism. In functionalist theory, a legal problem is not reviewed
through the assessment of the geographic entity or its sociological
context; rather, the focus is on a problem common to several nations
179
A
and on investigation into legal responses to the problem.
functionalist necessarily adopts several underlying premises: first, that
law is “an instrument for channeling human behavior and . . . answers to
social needs or interests;” second, that problems addressed by disparate
legal systems “are similar or even identical across different . . .
180
systems;” and third, that legal systems “solve[] these problems by quite
181
With these
different means though very often with similar results.”
principles, a functionalist may address a legal problem between nations,
offering cross-national insight.
With this methodology, functionalists may promote development of
the law through the adoption of institutions or procedures from foreign
182
The development of law through a functionalist process
systems.
therefore includes several steps: identifying a common problem;
examining solutions in different systems; and adoption of a foreign
183
With this methodology,
solution that addresses the problem.
functionalist assessment of varying legal systems can become a source

179. Oliver Brand, Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of
Comparative Legal Studies, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405, 409–10 (2007); Michele Graziadei, The
Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS
100, 102, 111 (Pierre LeGrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003) (citing INTRODUCTION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 1, at 34–35); Christopher A. Whytock, Taking Causality
Seriously in Comparative Constitutional Law: Insights from Comparative Politics and
Comparative Political Economy, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629, 636 (2008) (quoting
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 1, at 34); Ruti Teitel, Comparative
Constitutional Law in a Global Age, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2570, 2574 (2004) (book review).
180. Brand, supra note 179, at 409–10.
181. Graziadei, supra note 179, at 102 (quoting INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW, supra note 1, at 34).
182. See William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal
Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 489, 502–03 (1995); William Ewald, Comparative
Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1979 (1995)
[hereinafter Ewald, Try a Rat].
183. See, e.g., Brand, supra note 179, at 409–10; see also WATSON, supra note 9, 95–101;
Michele Graziadei, Legal Transplants and the Frontiers of Legal Knowledge, 10
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 723, 726–730 (2009) (stating that the similarities between the
German and Japanese civil codes may be explained as “the Japanese government’s choice to
rely on th[o]se Western models to change the law of Japan”).
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for legal reforms.184 Along these lines, the U.S. Supreme Court has often
185
noted the usefulness of foreign law in domestic interpretation issues.
Justice Breyer has supported this approach: “Willingness to consider
foreign judicial views in comparable cases is not surprising in a Nation
that from its birth has given a decent respect to the opinions of
186
mankind.”
Functionalism does have its critics, however. Mirjan Damaška notes
that the transplantation of legal structures from one nation to another—
often a part of functionalist reform—often has unintended
consequences: “In seeking inspiration for change, it is perhaps natural
for lawyers to go browsing in a foreign law boutique. But it is an illusion
to think that this is a boutique in which one is always free to purchase
187
some items and reject others.”
But Damaška’s criticism reveals an even larger point: the underlying
premises of functionalism may not survive critical appraisal. Critics of
the functional approaches to comparative methodology may operate
from several perspectives.
Among these, the culturalists reject
assessment of legal methodology independent of the society and unique
188
characteristics that created it. As one commentator notes, culturalist
184. WATSON, supra note 9, at 118; Bryan, supra note 9, at 538; Mirjan Damaška, The
Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and Continental Experiments, 45
AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 851–52 (1997); Markesinis, supra note 9, at 21.
185. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–77 (2005) (Kennedy, J.) (examining United
Nations, United Kingdom, and other nations’ laws to assess the use of juvenile death penalty;
stating that “the Court has [previously] referred to the laws of other countries and to
international authorities as instructive”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–73, 576 (2003)
(Kennedy, J.) (assessing European case law to examine sodomy law); Foster v. Florida, 537
U.S. 990, 992–93 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (assessing international decisions on delay in
death penalty); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing cases
which analyzed foreign law to interpret the Constitution, inter alia, Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 n.8, 718–19 n.16 (1997)); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
976–77 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (1996) (citing examples of Switzerland, Germany, and the
European Union, stating that “their experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem”); Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796–97 n.22 (1982) (citing
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977)).
186. Knight, 528 U.S. at 997 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
187. Damaška, supra note 184, at 852; see also Langbein, The Influence of Comparative
Procedure, supra note 10, at 552–53.
188. Brand, supra note 179, at 412–13, 428; see also Vlad F. Perju, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L.
170, 171 (2009) (reviewing THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (Sujit Choudhry
ed., 2006)) (discussing comparative law polarization between perspectives of “borrowing” and
“migration”). See generally Graziadei, supra note 179, at 126 (explaining the recent
emergence of culturalists).
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methodology requires a foreign system to be analyzed
from the inside and in socio-cultural context; and those who
engage in something less are in essence practicing cognitive
control over their readers and deluding themselves in the
process. . . . [T]he researcher must always delve beyond judicial
decisions, doctrinal writings and the black letter law of code and
statute and reach into the ill-defined region of “deeper
structures” where law perhaps meets philosophy, sociology, and
189
social culture.
In a culturalist assessment then, only immersion within the greater
190
contexts of the law allows for beneficial insight into foreign systems.
Other critics of the functionalist methodology pointedly reject the
191
which they see as
assumptions underlying functionalist theory,
192
oversimplifying issues. Some see the weaknesses of functionalism as
rooted in the problem that systems cannot be properly understood when
193
Other
unmoored from the philosophical bases of the law.
commentators criticize the traditional emphasis placed on a small
number of systems, usually the “common law” and “civil law” Western
194
Another criticism of functionalism is that the
European systems.
assumption that problems are similar across different systems cannot be
195
verified. In combination, the anti-functionalists argue, these concerns
lead to the conclusion that traditional comparative scholarship has often
196
been shallow and unhelpful, if not misleading or simply wrong.
The anti-functionalist criticisms offer appropriate insights into the
limits of functionalist theory. However, the responses of commentators
to the anti-functionalist arguments forcefully reject many criticisms as
189. Vernon Valentine Palmer, From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of
Comparative Law Methodology, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 261, 266 (2005).
190. See Allen, Idealization and Caricature, supra note 178, at 788; Allen et al., A Plea,
supra note 178, at 707–08; Ewald, Try a Rat, supra note 182, at 1977.
191. For the underlying assumptions of functionalism, see supra text accompanying
notes 179–181.
192. Ewald, Try a Rat, supra note 182, at 1963–65 (citations omitted) (cataloguing
criticisms of traditional comparative analysis).
193. Id. at 1896; Palmer, supra note 189, at 266.
194. Brand, supra note 179, at 414.
195. Id. at 417.
196. Ewald, Try a Rat, supra note 182, at 1968 (containing criticisms of traditional
comparative law).
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unrealistic and unhelpful. Palmer rejects the idea that foreign systems
can only be assessed by someone totally immersed in foreign culture.
I believe these strictures (of immersion critics) are, in part, based on
unrealistic assumptions that threaten to make the comparative law
enterprise quite impractical. They establish standards of research that
are generally unattainable, which means that no project is worth
beginning, or if it was begun or accomplished, will not be safe from
rigorous critique. And this only increases comparative law’s reputation
197
for being exotic and forbidding.
Accordingly, Palmer suggests that practical forms of research should
198
This pragmatic approach rejects
be considered entirely appropriate.
the “‘nearly insurmountable methodological hurdle’” of culturalist
199
methods.
Other commentators agree. In his analysis of the culturalist
approach, Bradley Bryan writes that indeed cultural explanations often
involve a uniquely American approach to law, but that does not mean
200
Bryan argues
there is nothing we can learn from civil law methods.
that it is appropriate to examine the fundamental differences and
similarities between systems, even if we cannot do an in-depth study of
201
the rich and complex histories of systems.
John Langbein goes a step further than Palmer or Bryan. He attacks
the culturalists’ ulterior motive of shielding the American system from
202
criticism based on comparative assessments. He goes so far to say that
arguments of American exceptionalism that defend the status quo
against comparative assessment based on “cultural differences” are not
based on an academic distinction, but rather demonstrate a tautological
belief system: “What [this] argument boils down to is the claim that we
Americans cannot aspire to such improvements because we are
203
Langbein, rejecting the
Americans and they are Germans.”

197. Palmer, supra note 189, at 266.
198. Id. at 264, 266.
199. Id. at 265 (quoting Janet E. Ainsworth, Categories and Culture: On the
“Rectification of Names” in Comparative Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 19, 25 (1996)).
200. Bryan, supra note 9, at 535–36, 539, 542, 554.
201. Id. at 543; see also Graziadei, supra note 179, at 113 (discussing the role of
functionalism as complementary to cultural approaches and noting that diversity in
approaches is beneficial).
202. John H. Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism in Comparative Law, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L
& COMP. L 41, 48–49 (1997) [hereinafter Langbein, Cultural Chauvinsim].
203. Id. at 45.
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limitations imposed by immersion theorists, assures us that crosscultural comparison from the functionalist perspective offers
204
appropriate suggestions to the improvement of the American system.
Even if those who counter the criticisms of functionalist theory—
such as Bryan, Langbein, or Palmer—fail to convince, perhaps the focus
can shift from theoretical generalities to the particular problem being
addressed. Since functionalism retains its position as the dominant
205
ideology of the comparative law realm, a functionalist approach must
be more persuasive in some areas, even if it is less in other areas of the
law. If that is true, the subject of experts fits squarely within the
boundaries of the domain where a functionalist approach is appropriate.
In particular, this Article examines four characteristics leading to this
conclusion.
First, the function of and rules for experts discussed here involves
private law rather than constitutional or public law concerns. Even
critics of functionalism recognize that areas of private law such as tort,
contract, and family law are areas that lend themselves more easily to
206
cross-national comparison than public or constitutional areas, which
are more closely associated with the unique historical and cultural
207
More succinctly, Ruti Teitel notes,
context of the nation.
“Historically, functionalism assumed that legal problems could simply
be excised from their political context, a notion easy to sustain in private
208
law.” Teitel continues by saying that constitutional or public law was
209
beyond the purview of traditional functionalism. Alan Watson further
suggests that “no area of private law can be designated as being
210
It
extremely resistant to change as a result of foreign influence.”
seems that private law issues—such as experts—are more likely to be
proper for functionalist assessment.
A second reason that expert witness issues are likely to be
appropriate for functionalist analysis is the narrow nature of the issue
being addressed. In general, commentators note that narrow problems
204. See id. at 41–42; see also Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 825
(suggesting reforms to American judicial factfinding based on German examples).
205. Brand, supra note 179, at 408.
206. See WATSON, supra note 9, at 98; Ewald, Try a Rat, supra note 182, at 1987; Teitel,
supra note 179, at 2575.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 188–191.
208. Teitel, supra note 179, at 2576.
209. Id.
210. WATSON, supra note 9, at 98 (emphasis added).
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and institutions offer comparative scholars with readily-accessible areas
211
for study. Scholars starting their research may, because of this, look to
a discrete area familiar to the scholar that is also present within the
212
By examining a familiar but narrow issue, that
foreign system.
comparative scholar’s analysis may “lead to reflection—if not crossfertilization of ideas and solutions” shaped by differences in structure
213
from the foreign system. Such differences may offer solutions that are
214
“‘packaged’ . . . for exportation,” and tailored to resolve narrow issues.
Expert reform fits this template, as a discrete transportable issue, and
“the most obvious of the European-inspired improvements that
215
Americans could make in their civil procedure.”
A third reason why functionalist approaches seem appropriately
applied to expert witness concerns is not as much an assessment of
functionalism alone, but a response to those criticisms leveled against it.
If immersion theorists and other anti-functionalists criticize
216
functionalism partially based on attacking its underlying assumptions,
then a demonstration that those assumptions are valid may blunt that
criticism. Expert concerns are one area where the functionalist
217
Concerns in the
assumption of similarity of problems appears valid.
proper use of experts in complex litigation are not limited to solely one
national legal system, but are common to many. The common concerns
include: how to balance expertise and legal process, how to preserve the
role of the factfinder when necessity dictates the need for specialized
evidence, and how to ensure the quality of the evidence being presented
218
on an issue factfinders do not themselves know. If these problems are
211. Michael Coester & Basil Markesinis, Liability of Financial Experts in German and
American Law: An Exercise in Comparative Methodology, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 275, 309
(2003).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure, supra note 10, at 552.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 191–196.
217. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
218. See CARL F. GOODMAN, JUSTICE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN 364–67 (2004)
[hereinafter GOODMAN, JUSTICE] (discussing changes to Japanese expert witness system to
address previous weaknesses in expert witness role and operation); MIKE REDMAYNE,
EXPERT EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 206–11 (2001) (reviewing and criticizing French
methods for expert selection and role of experts in criminal litigation); Ian Freckelton,
Judicial Attitudes Toward Scientific Evidence: The Antipodean Experience, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1137, 1149–50 (1997) (explaining that balancing the role of judge, jury, and expert in
cases involving complex evidence is a difficult problem, and has a long history in Australia
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similar between systems—and they appear to be—then the criticism of
the anti-functionalists that problems cannot be assessed without detailed
cultural or sociological assessments is unconvincing. Expert witness
issues do appear to fit within the confines of appropriate applications of
functionalist theory.
A final reason why functionalism may be appropriate to assess
expert witness procedures involves the underlying basis of much expert
witness testimony: that the scientific method aspires to achieve universal
219
and objective truth, and so is transnational in that sense. The scientific
method is
often
defined
by
“universalism,
communism,
220
To these ends,
disinterestedness, [and] organized skepticism.”
commentators note that “[i]t offends science, which prides itself on both
internationalism of cooperation and universality of truth, if its truths
221
and authority cannot flow freely across borders.” Of course, the goal
222
of science is to maximize universality and precision, not to achieve it.
Even so, the subject matter similarity of expert evidence allows isolation
of the legal structures in a way unavailable for, or more complicated in,
differing subject areas.
As such, the functionalist transnational
assessment of problem-solving techniques seems particularly
informative in this area.
and New Zealand); Petra van Kampen & Hans Nijboer, Daubert in the Lowlands, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 951, 970–88 (1997) (assessing the admissibility of expert testimony in complex
tort litigation in the Netherlands); Sanders, Science, Law, and Expert Witness, supra note 68,
at 73, 74 & n.53 (finding that when serving as an expert in litigation, expert witnesses must
balance their duty to scientific convention with their duty to the court; United Kingdom civil
procedure specifically states the expert’s duty to the court will outweigh its duty to the
retaining party); Sven Timmerbeil, The Role of Expert Witnesses in German and U.S. Civil
Litigation, 9 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 163, 179–85 (2003) (describing the role of judge
and expert in German court and offering criticisms of the balance of these roles in German
civil litigation). Many of these examples will be discussed in detail infra Parts IV.A–.E.
219. Regarding science as a universal methodology, see Sanders, Science, Law, and
Expert Witness, supra note 68, at 88 (scientific methods always include skepticism, empirical
assessment, intellectual honesty, and disinterestedness); and see also infra note 217 and
accompanying text.
220. ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 270 (1973). For a general description of these “imperatives,”
see id. at 270–78.
221. Charles Bazerman, How Does Science Come to Speak in the Courts? Citations,
Intertexts, Expert Witnesses, Consequential Facts, and Reasoning, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter 2009, at 91, 119.
222. Peter A. Alces, Contract Reconceived, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 39, 40 (2002) (quoting
PAUL HOYNINGEN-HUENE, RECONSTRUCTING SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS: THOMAS S.
KUHN’S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 23 (Alexander T. Levine trans., 1993)) (suggesting that
science seeks maximum precision and universality).
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Combining all four considerations—expert witnesses contained
within private law, the separation of a discrete issue from larger
concerns, commonality of problems of balancing scientific expertise and
legal process, and the basic universality of scientific inquiry—the
conclusion is that functionalist methodology is an appropriate means to
examine expert witnesses between foreign systems. This is not to say it
is the sole method, but only to say that it is an appropriate and
beneficial method to consider in reform efforts looking for possible ways
to improve systematic handling of experts; indeed, “[a] deeper
understanding of the theory and practice of another system” provides an
opportunity to “allow us to reflect more thoroughly on the possible
223
As such, the
consequences of pursuing change in our own system.”
systems of other major industrialized nations in handling experts should
offer insight into the balancing of legal process and scientific expertise
within the U.S. system.
IV. ANALYSIS OF OTHER NATIONS’ HANDLING OF EXPERT
WITNESSES IN LITIGATION
All major legal systems must manage the competing concerns of
legal process and scientific knowledge, preserving the role of the
factfinder while ensuring access to reliable scientific expertise. How
they do so may prove instructive to the American legal system,
consistent with Haack’s suggestion to seek solutions to Daubert’s
224
weaknesses in the handling of expert witnesses in other nations.
To assess whether we may find useful tools in the foreign examples,
this Article will assess procedures that apply to experts in complex tort
225
in the common-law systems of Canada and the United
cases
226
227
Kingdom, and in the civil law systems of Germany and Japan. For
each nation, this Article will describe the role and selection of experts,
the methods used to ensure scientific reliability for expert evidence, and
the preservation of the role of the factfinder from undue influences of
the expert. Then, it will be possible to suggest which methodologies
offer promise to address the weaknesses of the current management of

223.
system).
224.
225.
226.
227.

See Kinley & Rose, supra note 10, at 16 (discussing potential change to Australia’s
Haack, supra note 17, at 23.
See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
See infra Parts IV.A–.B.
See infra Parts IV.D–.E.

17 - JURS (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

7/9/2012 10:13 PM

BALANCING LEGAL PROCESS

1365

experts within the Daubert framework of the United States.228
A. Canada
The Canadian system is a useful starting point for assessing other
nations’ handling of complex evidence in court, since the basic structure
of tort liability and the basic test for judicial review of complex evidence
will be familiar to the American audience. Yet, some significant
differences in both substantive and procedural law provide an
interesting contrast with the Daubert regime in the United States.
1. Basic Admissibility Standards Under Canadian Law
Historically, Canadian courts have used a minimal standard for
admissibility of expert evidence, evaluating solely whether the evidence
229
A judge deciding the admissibility of
would be helpful to the jury.
expert testimony under this prior system would merely decide whether
the jury would be able to decide the issue for themselves, and if not,
230
Before
then a properly qualified expert could testify on the issue.
1994, Canadian courts consistently rejected Frye-type assessment of
231
reliability in use in the United States until 1993. However, in 1994, the
Canadian Supreme Court issued a watershed opinion that significantly
changed the previous standard for admission of expert testimony.
In R. v. Mohan, the Canadian Supreme Court adopted a four-part
232
Explicitly
test for the admission of proposed expert testimony.
rejecting the prior standard of helpfulness, the court determined that
admission is measured by the following: relevance of the expert
evidence, its “necessity in assisting the trier of fact,” “the absence of any
228. See infra Part V.
229. Sidney N. Lederman, Judges as Gatekeepers: The Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence Based on Novel Theories, in SPECIAL LECTURES 2003: THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
218, 221 (Law Society of Upper Canada, eds., 2004) (citing Fisher v. R., [1961] O.W.N. 94
(Can. Ont. C.A.), aff’d [1961] S.C.R. 535 (Can.)).
230. Lederman, supra note 226, at 221.
231. Sophia I Gatowski et al., The Diffusion of Scientific Evidence: A Comparative
Analysis of Admissibility Standards in Australia, Canada, England, and the United States, and
Their Impact on Social and Behavioural Sciences, 4 EXPERT EVIDENCE 86, 87–88 (1996)
(citing R. v. Beland, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 398 (Can.) (Wilson, J., dissenting); R. v. Johnston, 1992
CarswellOnt 78 paras. 63–82 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.)); see also P. Brad Limpert, Beyond the
Rule in Mohan: A New Model for Assessing the Reliability of Scientific Evidence, 54 U.
TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 65, 79–80 (1996). But see R. v. Medvedew, [1978] 6 W.W.R. 208, 221
(Can. Man. C.A.) (O’Sullivan, J.A., dissenting) (writing that “to me [the Frye standard]
makes sound sense and expresses a view in accord with the principles of the common law”)).
232. R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, 20 (Can.).
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exclusionary rule,” and whether there is “a properly qualified expert.”233
As a result, expert admissibility decisions need more rigorous
234
While not explicitly citing Daubert, Mohan
assessment than before.
included reliability assessment as part of the determination of relevance
235
within the four factors. For those expert opinions that are considered
to be a “novel scientific theory or technique,” the court suggested a
236
more rigorous test requiring “special scrutiny” to ensure reliability.
Even with the four-part test, Mohan raised as many questions as it
resolved.
In the years immediately following Mohan, Canadian courts made
237
Some courts applied
reliability assessments in a variety of ways.
factors similar to Daubert—looking at peer review, general acceptance,
238
Other courts applied vaguer
and known or potential rate of error.
239
standards. Still others applied a fourteen-factor reliability test from a
240
While Mohan
precise inquiry predating Mohan, in R v. Johnston.
contained language clarifying the standard for judicial gatekeeping in
Canada, its application remained uncertain following the decision.
The Canadian Supreme Court clarified the gatekeeping standard in
241
In R. v. J.-L.J., a criminal case tried
the 2000 case of R. v. J.-L.J.
233. Id.
234. Lederman, supra note 226, at 221–22; Paul Mitchell & Renu Mandhane, The
Uncertain Duty of the Expert Witness, 42 ALTA. L. REV. 635, 641 (2005) (suggesting that “it is
now more difficult to have expert testimony admitted in both criminal and civil
proceedings”).
235. Robert S. Harrison & Emily E. Marrocco, The Nuts and Bolts of Expert Evidence,
25 ADVOC. Q. 157, 159–60 (2002); Lederman, supra note 227, at 222; David Paciocco, Taking
a “Goudge” out of Bluster and Blarney: An “Evidence-Based Approach” to Expert Testimony,
13 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 135, 147 (2009) (“Traditionally, ‘reliability’ of the expert’s theories or
techniques has been tested under the ‘relevance’ branch of the Mohan inquiry.”).
236. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 25.
237. See Limpert, supra note 231, at 83 (citing Petro-Can. v. Can.-Nfld. Offshore Petrol.
Bd., [1995] 127 D.L.R. 4th 483, 504–05 (Can. Nfld. S.C.); and R. v. J.E.T., 1994 CarswellOnt
3370, para. 75–87 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.) (WL)).
238. J.E.T., 1994 CarswellOnt 3370 para. 75 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc,
509 U.S. 579, 589–94 (1993)).
239. Lederman, supra note 226, at 223–25 (citing R. v. Terceira (1998), 38 O.R. 3d 175
(Can. Ont. C.A.) and concluding that the Judge “decline[d] to enumerate a specific structure
that must be adhered to in every case,” leaving it to court discretion for reliability analysis in
each case).
240. R. v. Johnston, [1992] 12 C.R. 4th 99 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Lederman, supra note 226,
at 225. Limpert states the Johnston standard, with its 14-point analysis, “may be somewhat
helpful to a judge but it sets out a confusing, incoherent, and redundant legal standard.”
Limpert, supra note 231, at 81–82.
241. R. v. J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600 (Can.).
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without a jury, the court emphasized that the gatekeeping role is
essential to keep out improper expert evidence and avoid its distorting
242
effects on a trial —and that remained true for cases with a judicial
243
factfinder as well as jury cases. In addition to stressing the importance
of gatekeeping, the court in R. v. J.-L.J. further clarified the reliability
test for experts who testify to a new or novel scientific theory, subject to
244
“special scrutiny” under Mohan. For such evidence, the court thought
it especially important that courts ensure that improper evidence stays
out of the case, by assessing reliability under the Daubert factors:
testing, “peer review and publication,” “known or potential rate of
245
error,” and general acceptance. In analyzing these factors, judges will
determine if the new or novel science is reliable enough for
246
consideration by the factfinder.
Through the establishment of a test for gatekeeping in Mohan, and
the clarification of that standard for novel science in R. v. J.-L.J., the
Canadian Supreme Court ensured trial judges assess scientific reliability
of expert evidence prior to admission.
2. Application of the Standard—Role of Jury, Complex Case Law
So, since 1994, the Canadian Supreme Court has rejected the
previous standard of helpfulness. Analysis of the scope, purposes, and
application of the Canadian standard will help assess whether the system
works, and also its similarity to gatekeeping in the United States.
When establishing uniform rules for Canadian gatekeeping, one
initial consideration involves the different circumstances of civil jury
trials in that nation. In Canada, trial by jury remains largely confined to
criminal law cases, as guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and
247
Freedoms. In civil cases, jury trials are rare, occurring only in some
242. Id. paras. 28–29, 61 (internal citations omitted).
243. Id. para. 25 (noting the need to “preserve and protect the role of the trier of fact—
the judge or the jury” (emphasis added)); id. para. 56 (holding expert opinions to be outside
the knowledge of the judge or jury and that the opinions must “‘enable the trier of fact to
appreciate the matters in issue due to their technical nature’” (quoting R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2
S.C.R. 9, 23 (Can.))).
244. Id. paras. 33–35 (citing Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 25; Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993)).
245. Id. para. 33.
246. See id. paras. 34–35.
247. See Neil Vidmar, The Canadian Criminal Jury: Searching for a Middle Ground,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1999, at 141, 146–47 (quoting Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms § 11(f), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
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provinces and for certain claims.248 Even in provinces where civil jury
trials are generally permitted, the judge may remove a case from
249
With
consideration by a jury on the basis of significant complexity.
these rules, a trial regarding a civil claim based on complex scientific
evidence is extraordinarily rare or nonexistent, and so one could
conclude gatekeeping as established by Mohan is unnecessary since the
court can consider, as factfinder, the ultimate conclusion. This unified
approach is how complex evidence assessment occurs in the United
250
For Canadian courts, however, the gatekeeping function
Kingdom.
251
remains significant and important at the admission stage. The reason
gatekeeping remains important, even in the absence of a civil jury trial,
is the purposes it is intended to serve.
Gatekeeping clearly serves the function of ensuring that only
reliable evidence gets considered at trial. Since only reliable evidence
will be admitted, expert evidence is intended to help reach an accurate
252
conclusion based on the current state of science. Unreliable evidence
is excluded, then, to ensure that it does not distort the factfinding

Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.)).
248. W.A. Bogart, “Guardian of Civil Rights . . . Medieval Relic”: The Civil Jury in
Canada, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1999, at 305, 306–07 (finding that some provinces
prohibit jury trial, while some allow it for certain claims—for example, Alberta allows jury
trial for tort claims and British Columbia and Ontario allow jury trials with certain
exceptions).
249. Id. at 307–08 (citing Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/09, R. 12–6(5)
(Can.), permitting a judge to hear the trial without a jury when the case involves scientific
investigation or is complex or intricate).
250. See infra Part IV.B.
251. J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600, paras. 25, 28–29 (intending gatekeeping to “preserve
and protect the role of the trier of fact—the judge or the jury” (emphasis added)); Taylor v.
Liong, 2007 CarswellBC 347 (Can. B.C.S.C.)(WL) (emphasizing gatekeeping role as
envisioned by J.-L.J.); Taylor, 2007 CarswellBC 347, para. 197 (noting difference between
threshold reliability and ultimate reliability); Chan v. Erin Mills Town Centre Corp., 2005
CarswellOnt 6741, paras. 27, 31–33 (Can. Ont. S.C.)(WL) (internal citations omitted).
252. R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, 20–21, 24 (Can.) (finding that admission of expert
evidence is based on the assessment of reliability versus effect to ensure that the probative
value is worth its cost on the trial process and is reviewed for the potential to distort the
factfinding process); Gatowski et al., supra note 231, at 88; Vidmar, supra note 247, at 166–67
(“An important goal of the Mohan decision was to prevent juries from being influenced by
unreliable expert evidence . . . .”); see also J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600, para. 29 (expert
evidence as part of the search for truth); Graham D. Glancy & John M.W. Bradford, The
Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Canada, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 350, 351
(2007) (nothing that the Mohan court “stated that expert evidence should not be admitted
when there is a danger that it will be misused or distort the fact-finding process”).
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process with an invalid conclusion.253 The gatekeeping function also
underscores the role of the expert vis-à-vis the fact finder. Canadian
courts repeatedly emphasize that an expert is to assist in finding the
254
facts, but not to “usurp the functions of the trier of fact.”
Two examples of courts applying the standards from Mohan and R.
v. J.-L.J. underscore these purposes. In a 2005 case, Chan v. Erin Mills
Town Centre, the Ontario Supreme Court assessed expert evidence
regarding a link between the plaintiff’s post-polio syndrome and a slip255
The court noted the
and-fall accident at the defendant’s store.
concern that reliability assessment in civil cases, when the judge sits
alone as factfinder, lacks the rationale it has in the case of jury trials,
256
where a jury may be overwhelmed by the expert’s testimony. While
noting the difference, the court did not dismiss the gatekeeping function
or deny that gatekeeping is mandated by Canadian law; it instead
concluded that the gatekeeping standard had been met for the proposed
257
expert.
In 2007, in Taylor v. Liong, the Supreme Court of British Columbia
faced the issue of admission of expert medical testimony claiming
258
multiple sclerosis had been caused by an automobile accident.
Initially, the court noted the Mohan test as the standard for the
259
assessment of admissibility under Canadian law. Taylor cites Chan to
underscore the importance of gatekeeping in the context of both

253. J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. para. 29 (searching for the truth excludes expert evidence
that may “distort the fact finding process”); Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 24; see also STEPHEN
T. GOUDGE, INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY IN ONTARIO 470–71 (2008)
(suggesting that “the judge must bear the heavy burden of being the ultimate gatekeeper in
protecting the system from unreliable expert evidence”), available at http://www.attorney
general.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/goudge/index.html.
254. Glancy & Bradford, supra note 252, at 351–52; J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. para. 56
(purpose of expert evidence “is not to substitute the expert for the trier of fact”); Mohan,
[1994] 2 S.C.R. at 24 (stating that experts should not usurp the functions of the trier of fact);
Taylor, 2007 CarswellBC 347, para. 183 (stating that it is improper for experts overtake
judicial functions); Chan, 2005 CarswellOnt 6741, para. 35; R. v. Dimitrov (2003), 68 O.R. 3d
641, para. 56 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (noting that the lower court held that the expert evidence in
question risked distorting the factfinding process, especially due to its weak relevance and
reliability); see also Lederman, supra note 226, at 241–42 (noting concerns about usurpation
of factfinder by either expert or by the judge).
255. Chan, 2005 CarswellOnt 6741, paras. 1–4.
256. Id. paras. 30–31.
257. Id. para. 33.
258. Taylor v. Liong, 2007 CarswellBC 347, paras. 1, 3 (Can. B.C. S.C.) (WL).
259. Id. paras. 58–60.
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criminal and civil cases.260 The court then emphasized the need to be
wary of overuse of experts, and preserving the role of expert as distinct
261
from the role of judge or factfinder. Finally, the court determined that
in the case of novel science, the R. v. J.-L.J. factors are helpful in
262
evaluating novel science. In applying these tests, the court held that
one expert proffered by the plaintiff failed to meet proper standards for
263
reliability and should not testify. Thus, the court assessed the scientific
merit and background of the expert opinion to reach its conclusions in
264
both Taylor and Chan.
Ultimately, the Canadian tests appear to operate similarly to the
American Daubert standard, both assessing minimal reliability of the
265
evidence prior to admission.
3. Differences from the American Daubert System
If the Canadian standard operates in a roughly similar way to the
American test under Daubert, then it is important to examine the
distinctions between Canadian and U.S. gatekeeping.
Substantively, the Canadian system creates an explicit distinction
between new and novel scientific theories requiring special scrutiny and
266
those passing under the standard Mohan test. In Daubert, general
acceptance is one of the reliability factors, but is not written so that all
267
Of course, Daubert
non-novel science is subject to lesser scrutiny.
assessments of new, untested, or cutting-edge theories may be more
elaborate, but the same factors have been approved for all gatekeeping
268
questions. With Mohan and R. v. J.-L.J., the differentiation between
new and other scientific evidence allows for an explicit recognition that
260. Id. paras. 63–64 (citing Chan, 2005 CarswellOnt 6741, para. 31).
261. Id. paras. 66–73 (citing R. v. J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600, paras. 25, 28, 30, 33, 34
(Can.)).
262. Id. para. 72 (citing J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600, para. 33).
263. Id. para. 189 (stating that the expert’s opinion lacked reliability due to “logical
frailty and lack of coherence.”).
264. Id. para. 74–176; Chan v. Erin Mills Town Ctr., 2005 CarswellOnt 6741, paras. 46–77
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. of Justice)(WL).
265. Vidmar, supra note 247, at 166 (concluding that the Canadian Mohan test is
“roughly similar” to the tests used in Daubert and Joiner).
266. J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600, para. 35; R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, 25 (Can.). See
text accompanying notes 233, 241–243 (describing Mohan test).
267. See text accompanying notes 25–27 (describing that reliability factors apply to all
forms of expert evidence).
268. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993).
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this type of evidence will be subject to special scrutiny.269
Beyond the substantive tests, Canadian courts offer some procedural
tools not utilized by American courts in order to assist gatekeepers and
factfinders assess expert evidence. One of these involves the courts
expressing an
increasing recognition . . . that experts owe . . . a fiduciary duty to
the courts and tribunals they seek to enlighten; it is expected that
experts will make every effort to give their evidence objectively
and independently of the interests of the party who called them
270
and of other tainting influences.
While necessarily paid by a retaining party, the expert is expected to
“don a scientist’s hat,” and, in doing so, the opinions expressed will be
271
However, if the expert loses objectivity, the
considered by a court.
272
courts “will be reluctant to give much weight to [his or] her opinion.”
While in the United States experts are normally intended to provide the
273
trier of fact with scientific or expert information, courts can—but often
274
do not—consider partisan pressures in the admissibility decision.
269. J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. para. 35; Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 25 (Can.).
270. David M. Paciocco, Unplugging Jukebox Testimony in an Adversarial System:
Strategies for Changing the Tune on Partial Experts, 34 QUEEN’S L.J. 565, 570 (2009); see also
Morgan v. Metropolitan Toronto, 2006 CarswellOnt 7866, para. 276 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. of
Justice) (“Expert witnesses must be objective and independent. They must present their
evidence in the style of scientists, not cheerleaders.”); Mitchell & Mandhane, supra note 234,
at 643–44 (describing that even though Canadian courts deal with the problem differently, all
“Canadian courts and tribunals have indicated a greater willingness to scrutinize the role
played by expert witnesses”). But see Mitchell & Mandhane, supra, at 644 (noting that
Canadian courts lack a uniform method to handle or sanction expert witness bias); Paciocco,
supra, at 586 (finding that “the existence of [special expert] duties remains controversial”).
271. Morgan, 2006 CarswellOnt 7866, paras. 277–278 (internal citations omitted).
272. Id. para. 279 (citations omitted). Paciocco states that “[o]rdinarily, courts simply
take bias, partiality and influence into account when weighing the testimony.” Paciocco,
supra note 270, at 571. He then calls for exclusion of patently biased evidence, using a
formalized rule-based system for compliance. Id. at 585–89, 595–99; see also Mitchell &
Mandhane, supra note 234, at 644 (“Where an expert is partial or lacks independence, his or
her evidence may be given less weight or deemed inadmissible despite satisfaction of the four
Mohan criteria.”).
273. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
274. Generally, the Daubert factors do not directly connect concerns regarding witness
partisanship to the admission decision for the proposed expert evidence. See text
accompanying notes 19–27. It is precisely the lack of inquiry into partisanship that led Judge
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Rather, the partisanship of the evidence remains largely independent of
its reliability under the Daubert test, a subject likely to result in crossexamination after admission but unlikely in and of itself to result in
exclusion.
A second Canadian procedure utilized to assist gatekeepers and
factfinders assess expert evidence (which is also not used in U.S. courts)
relates to the summation of the evidence by the judge at the end of the
275
trial. In the context of jury trials—in Canada, mostly criminal cases —
the court summarizes the evidence for the jury prior to the
276
deliberations. The summation will involve judicial clarification of the
contested issues and facts, but not repeat the entire state of all evidence.
The judge need not provide the jury with an oral replay of the
evidence of each witness, but must relate the most important evidence
to the key factual and legal issues. The object is to leave the jury with a
sufficient understanding of the value and effect of the most significant
277
evidence as it relates to the relevant issues.
The obligation to summarize the evidence prior to the deliberation is
278
binding on the judge, and may result in trial error if improperly done.
The summation can include lengthy assessment of key evidence from
experts, as evinced by the detailed summations of psychiatric testimony
279
Ultimately, in the
in a case involving a defense of mental disorder.
summary, the court must “review the substantial parts of the evidence,
and give the jury the theory of the defence, so that they may appreciate
the value and effect of that evidence, and how the law is to be applied to
280
The judge should define for the jury
the facts as they find them.”
those issues critical to the case and separate out those that may be
Kozinski to add an additional factor to the Supreme Court’s reliability factors in Daubert II:
whether the research was done independently of the litigation in question. Daubert II, 43
F.3d 1311, 1317–18 (9th Cir. 1995).
275. See supra notes 247–249 and accompanying text.
276. Vidmar, supra note 247, at 165; see also Michael Hall, Judicial Comment and the
Jury’s Role in the Criminal Trial, 11 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 247, 267–68 (2007) (quoting Azoulay
v. R., [1952] 2 S.C.R. 495, 498 (Can.)).
277. R. v. Smith, 2007 CarswellAlta 938, para. 77 (Can. Alta. C.A.)(WL) (Frazer, C.J. &
Fruman, J., concurring) (citing R. v. Jacquard, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 314, para. 14 (Can.); and
Azoulay, [1952] 2 S.C.R. at 497–98).
278. R. v. Karaibrahimovic, 2002 CarswellAlta 550, paras. 32, 34, 37, 47 (Can. Alta.
C.A.)(WL).
279. See, e.g., Jacquard, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 314, para. 15 (including a judicial summary
fifteen pages long, which summarized the evidence of the mental disorder claimed by the
accused).
280. Azoulay, [1952] 2 S.C.R. at 498.
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uncontested or tangential. The jury will deliberate only after the judge’s
summation.
Beyond the summation of evidence, which is intended to objectively
assess the issues and evidence in the case, Canadian courts have a third
procedure to assist in assessing the expert evidence: the court’s
comment on the evidence. Judicial comment goes a step beyond the
mere summation, which remains free of expressions of opinions on the
evidence; it involves the express statement of the judicial belief about
281
the evidence. The judge can express an opinion to the jury regarding
the “importance of various pieces of evidence and may even offer an
282
opinion regarding the credibility of a witness.” The limit on judicial
comment is unclear, although courts have held that the commenting
judge must inform the jury that comment is “given as advice and not
283
direction,” so that the jury is less likely to be “overawed” by the
284
This judicial comment is a separate judicial power
judge’s views.
285
related to, but distinct from, the judicial summation.
Like American courts, Canadian courts screen evidence prior to
admission to preserve minimal standards of reliability. However, the
Canadian system does offer some differences that contrast with the
American system with Daubert, and provides a useful starting point for
the study of comparative expert methodology in foreign legal systems.
B. United Kingdom
The handling of expert witnesses in the United Kingdom is
substantially different from the U.S. system. Many of the distinctions
are based on procedural differences between tort systems, but the
Canadian example demonstrates that differences in tort procedure need
not result in completely different systems for expert management. In
the U.K. example, however, the bulk of expert review is not at the
gatekeeping stage at all, but occurs instead at the merits stage. Review

281. Hall, supra note 276, at 249–50.
282. Vidmar, supra note 247, at 165. In contrast, such comments are specifically
prohibited under American judicial standards. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 3, R. 3.3 (2011), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/toc.html; CODE OF
CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES, Canon 3(A)(6) (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
RulesAndPolicies/CodesOfConduct/CodeConductUnitedStatesJudges.aspx.
283. R. v. Gunning, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 627, para. 27 (Can.); see also Hall, supra note 276, at
249–53.
284. R. v. Garofoli, 1988 CarswellOnt 68, para. 111 (Can. Ont. C.A.)(WL).
285. See supra text accompanying note 278.
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of management of experts in the United Kingdom again reveals a legal
system struggling with the proper balance of reliability, assistance to the
factfinder, and legal process.
1. Basics of Case Management in the United Kingdom
Evaluation of the role of the expert witness in the U.K. cannot begin
without a preliminary assessment of the management of tort cases
286
within the system. While U.K. tort law includes considerations of duty
and breach by negligence—as in the United States and Canada—the
differing procedural management of these cases has a large effect on the
287
level of judicial management of expert witnesses.
In the United Kingdom, jury trials are much less common than in the
United States. In England, juries are required for certain enumerated
288
criminal offenses, but a civil jury is limited to only certain claims, such
as slander and libel, fraud, malicious prosecution, and false
289
Dr. Richard Goldberg notes that personal injury
imprisonment.
actions in tort are generally decided by bench trials, and that the last
290
reported jury trial for personal injuries occurred in 1965. In modern
litigation, a civil jury trial in England for a personal injury claim remains
291
possible, but for only “exceptional” cases. Even within the few areas
286. This review will continue for all remaining examples, infra Parts IV.D–.E.
287. See Richard Goldberg, Scientific Evidence, Causation and the Law—Lessons of
Bendectin (Debendox) Litigation, 4 MED. L. REV. 32, 42 (1996) (describing the connection of
the jury rules to the issue of evidentiary standards). Regarding tort law in the U.K. generally,
see TONY WEIR, TORT LAW (2002) (providing an overview of substantive tort law in the
U.K.).
288. Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Cheryl Thomas, Decline of the “Little Parliament”: Juries
and Jury Reform in England and Wales, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1999, at 7, 15
(explaining how offenses are classified into indictable offenses tried only to a jury, summary
offenses with bench trials, and those “triable either way”). Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas state
that only 1%–2% of criminal cases are tried to a jury, and only 18% of cases before the
Crown Court are “indictable only” and triable only in that court. Id. at 15–16; see also GARY
SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 127–49, 482 (6th ed. 2003) (noting
similar numbers and describing offenses tried to the judge in Magistrate courts, indictable
offenses tried to a jury in Crown Court, and those that may be tried either way).
289. Goldberg, supra note 287, at 41 (citing Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, § 69 (Eng.));
see also SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 288, at 478.
290. Goldberg, supra note 287, at 41 (citing Hodges v. Harland & Wolff, Ltd., [1965] 1
W.L.R. 523 (C.A.)).
291. Id. at 41 (citing Ward v. James, [1966] 1 Q.B. 273 (C.A.)) (only exceptional
circumstances allow jury trial). Exceptional circumstances include punitive or exemplary
damages claimed in response to a deliberate abuse of authority, per Goldberg, supra note 287,
at 41 (citing H. v. Ministry of Def., [1991] 2 Q.B. 103, 112 (C.A.)); see also SLAPPER &
KELLY, supra note 288, at 481 (discussing jury trials in exemplary damages cases); Nancy S.
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where a civil jury trial is permitted, a claim involving complex evidence
(such as difficult scientific evidence on causation) would also be
292
As a result, civil jury
considered to be inappropriate for jury trial.
trials for complex personal injuries torts are technically possible, but
extraordinarily rare.
Scottish law is more permissive than English law regarding jury trials
293
in personal injury actions, as Dr. Goldberg notes, based on differences
294
But, he
in Scottish statutory law that allows juries in these actions.
notes, a jury is “invariably used in personal injury actions where no
special difficulties of law or fact are involved . . . [and i]t would seem,
therefore, that cases involving questions of causation and medicinal
products would rarely come before a jury in the English courts, and
295
would only do so in the Scottish courts at the damages stage.”
Complexity of evidence may not be permitted as the sole basis for
removal of a case from a jury, but can be one consideration in removal
296
decisions. As a result, complex tort cases in Scotland are also unlikely
to be decided except by bench trial.
Independent of the statutory framework, practical considerations
may also limit a litigant’s access to a jury trial. In the U.K., contingency
fee contracts for attorneys were, until recently, forbidden and
297
“unthinkable.” In addition, both attorneys’ and other fees shift based

Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1041, 1101 n.257 (1995) (discussing the paucity of civil jury trials in England).
292. Goldberg, supra note 287, at 41 (citing Singh v. London Underground, Ltd., (1990)
Independent, 25 April (Q.B.)). See generally Taylor v. Anderson, [1995] 1 W.L.R. 447 (C.A.)
(discussing complexity exception to jury trial); Beta Constr., Ltd., v. Channel Four Television
Co., [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1042 (C.A.) (same).
293. Goldberg, supra note 287, at 42.
294. Id. (citing Court of Session Act, 1988, c. 36, § 11 (Scot.)).
295. Id. (footnotes omitted).
296. Id. at 42 n.67 (citing DAVID MAXWELL, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF
SESSION 299 (1980)).
297. Richard L. Abel, An American Hamburger Stand in St. Paul’s Cathedral: Replacing
Legal Aid with Conditional Fees in English Personal Injury Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV.
253, 253 (2001) (discussing new rules for fees in the U.K. since 1995). See generally Peter
Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency Fee
Contacts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231 (1998) (providing an analysis of the
basis for the use and nonuse of contingency fees). Regarding the modern “conditional fee”
system, see Virginia G. Maurer et al., Attorney Fee Arrangements: The U.S. and Western
European Perspectives, 19 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 272, 307–16 (1999); see also ROBIN M.
WHITE & IAN D. WILLOCK, THE SCOTTISH LEGAL SYSTEM 344 (3d ed. 2003) (describing the
contingency fee ban in Scotland).
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on a “loser pays” system.298 Even in the event of a successful verdict,
damage awards seldom include punitive damages, reducing the
299
The combined effect of
availability of larger recovery to litigants.
300
these considerations is further reduction in the potential for jury trials.
Without the civil jury to consider the merits of a claim, the bench
trial necessarily will involve the judicial assessment of the merits of the
litigants’ evidence at the final adjudication phase of the trial. The
combined effect of these rules lessens the need for judicial gatekeeping
301
The admission stage generally does not
at the admissibility stage.
then, in the United Kingdom, involve consideration of the reliability of
the evidence, as it has in the United States under Daubert or in Canada
302
under Mohan and R. v. J.-L.J.
2. Basic Expert Procedure Within the United Kingdom
Since civil jury trials are extraordinarily rare, the admissibility stage
has generally not been used as a time for the judge to assess expert
303
testimony. So the standard for admission of expert evidence for jury
trials, such as it is, is almost entirely discussed in the context of criminal
298. CIV. PROC. R. 44.3(2)(a) (Eng.) (“[T]he general rule is that the unsuccessful party
will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party . . . .”); LORD JUSTICE JACKSON,
REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: PRELIMINARY REPORT 467–68 (2009), available at
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/642936FA-292D-4432-8CF2-B2A44C7FC4FB/0/ja
cksonvol2low.pdf (concluding that the loser pays as a general rule in England). See generally
David A Root, Note, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and
Combining the “American Rule” and “English Rule,” 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 583,
589–91, 601–10 (2005) (reviewing history and effect of the English fee-shifting rule).
Regarding Scottish fee shifting, see LORD JUSTICE JACKSON, supra, app. 9, at 550 (citing
Howie v. Alexander & Sons, (1948) S.C. 154, 157 (Scot.)) (noting that costs generally follow
the suit); see also McGregor v. Alpha Airports Grp. PLC, (2010) CSOH 51 [30] (Scot.)
(noting that costs follow suit, and citing Howitt, (1948) S.C. at 157).
299. See Andrew Tettenborn, Punitive Damages—A View from England, 41 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1551, 1551–56, 1551 n.1 (2004) (noting that English punitive damages were extremely
limited from 1963–2001 and that Scottish law disallows punitive damages awards (citing
2 DAVID M. WALKER, PRINCIPLES OF SCOTTISH PRIVATE LAW 160 (3d ed. 1983))).
300. See ERICA BEECHER-MONAS, EVALUATING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLECTUAL DUE PROCESS 57 n.1 (2007)
(suggesting that these factors reduce the chance of toxic tort cases being brought).
301. See REDMAYNE, supra note 218, at 98 (qualifications as sole issue for pre-admission
reliability testing; argues for reliability-based exclusionary rule for expert evidence) (citations
omitted); Goldberg, supra note 287, at 52.
302. Regarding reliability assessment under Daubert, see text accompanying notes 25–
27. Regarding reliability assessment under Mohan or R. v. J.-L.J., see text accompanying
notes 232–246.
303. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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cases, where jury trials do continue. But, in these cases the standard for
admission remains extraordinarily low.
The basic admissibility standard in English criminal law comes from
304
In Turner, the court held that the test for
the case of R. v. Turner.
admission of expert witness testimony should hinge on whether the
expert can “furnish the court with scientific information which is likely
305
to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury.” Since
the evidence in Turner was largely within the ordinary human
experience of the jury, the court deemed that the psychiatrist’s
306
testimony should not have been offered.
Case law since Turner—decided in 1975—confirms that the
admissibility standard of English criminal case law is mainly concerned
with the expert’s helpfulness to an issue outside the range of the jury’s
307
knowledge. In the case of R. v. Robb in 1991, Lord Justice Bingham
focused on the determination of qualifications of the expert, holding
that the issue should involve “whether study and experience will give a
witness’s opinion an authority which the opinion of one not so qualified
308
will lack,” and whether the witness is skilled and has experience. As a
result, the court admitted expert voice-identification evidence over a
defense objection, without verification by acoustic analysis as requested
309
by the defense. Lord Justice Kennedy used a similar approach in his
310
opinion in a 2002 case, R. v. Dallagher, formulating the test for
admission of expert evidence as “‘whether the issue [was] one on which
the jury could be assisted by expert evidence, and whether the expert
311
Some U.K.
tendered had the expertise to provide such evidence.’”
case law—notably R v. Gilfoyle and R. v. O’Doherty—indicates some
interest in assessing reliability of the expert evidence prior to admission;
312
in Gilfoyle the court drew an analogy to Frye and Daubert. However,
304. [1975] Q.B. 834 (C.A.).
305. Id. at 841.
306. Id. at 842.
307. [1991] 93 Crim. App. R. 161, at 165 (Eng.).
308. Id. at 165.
309. Id. at 165–67.
310. [2002] EWCA (Crim.) 1903, [2003] 1 Crim. App. R. 12 (Eng.).
311. Id. para. 25 (quoting R. v. Stockwell, [1993] 97 Crim. App. R. 260, 264).
312. R. v. O’Doherty, [2002] N.I. 263, [2003] 1 Cr. App. R. 5, ¶60 (appeal from Northern
Ireland) (rejecting expert evidence, but also rejecting Gilfoyle stringent standard); R v.
Gilfoyle, [2001] 2 Cr. App. R. 5, ¶ 25 (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923)); see also William E. O’Brian Jr., Court Scrutiny of Expert Evidence: Recent Decisions
Highlight the Tensions, 7 INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 172, 172–73 (2003).
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commentators on the state of expert review agree that the less stringent
313
standard represents the current state of the law in the U.K.
In civil cases, English law permits the admission of expert evidence
when it meets the statutory requirements of the Civil Evidence Act of
314
1972. Pursuant to Section 3(1), an expert in a civil case may state an
“opinion on any relevant matter on which he is qualified to give expert
315
evidence.” As will be discussed below, most commentators consider
the standard created by this statutory formula to be minimal, and not
inconsistent with the lax standard for the criminal cases discussed above.
Legal scholars assessing the standard for review of expert admission
agree that the reliability review of expert testimony in England—
whether in civil or criminal cases—is minimal. In his article Court
Scrutiny of Expert Evidence, William O’Brian notes that the “English
cases appear to require nothing more than that the expert testimony in
question [be] relevant and that the witness [be] more knowledgeable
316
Such minimal standards provide no
than the jury on the subject.”
reliability standard, and as such, “put further strain on the potential for
317
miscarriages of justice.” David Ormerod agrees that these standards
318
allow evidence without significant reliability assessment. Without any
tests to assess the reliability of the evidence, Ormerod notes that English
law will admit questionable expert evidence “despite its inherent
319
defects,” and that “there is little to prevent a court [from] receiving
320
With admission of
this evidence as expert opinion evidence.”
questionable expert evidence, Ormerod decided these standards result
in few checks to protect “the integrity and accuracy of the trial
321
process.”
Since admissibility review involves such minimal assessment of an
expert’s qualifications and the relevance of his or her testimony, nearly
all of the reliability assessment of expert evidence in tort cases from the

313. See text accompanying notes 315–321.
314. Civil Evidence Act, 1972, c. 30 (Eng.).
315. Id. § 3(1).
316. O’Brian, supra note 312, at 180.
317. Id. at 184.
318. David Ormerod, Psychological Autopsies: Legal Implications and Admissibility, 5
INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 1, 18–21 (2001).
319. Id. at 20.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 30.
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U.K. occurs at the adjudication stage.322 Examples of English judicial
decisions demonstrate extraordinarily detailed review of highly complex
scientific evidence in determining whether a claimant has proven a
323
claim. In one case, XYZ v. Schering Health Care, Mr. Justice Mackay
noted that, as adjudicator of the dispute, he must determine which
evidence was reliable and which was not; he then reviewed forty-two
days of testimony involving complex epidemiological studies for
324
Scottish case law also shows similar assessments of
scientific merit.
complex science, with judges reviewing the evidence in detail at the
325
For example, in Dingley v. Chief Constable of
adjudication phase.
Strathclyde, Lord Dawson assessed epidemiological studies in the
assessment of injury causation, and held that the relationship of trauma
326
to multiple sclerosis had not been proven by the plaintiff. Dawson’s
skill in evidence review in Dingley has been described as a “master class
327
in legal exposition of very complex matters.”
Yet for all the skill demonstrated by the Justices in Scherling or
Dingley, the issue of reliability tests remains one in dispute within the
U.K.
3. Potential for Change to System
Considering the current standard for admissibility in case law, some
commentators suggest that a reliability standard should be adopted in
the U.K. In this regard, some suggest adoption of the American
Daubert standard—even with its potential weaknesses—due to its
potential to sort out reliable evidence.
The problem with low admission standards is that, once deemed a
qualified expert, nearly any evidence from the expert gets admitted and
considered by the court. As a result, the potential for “junk science” to
invade the courthouse remains a persistent problem, which
322. Goldberg, supra note 287, at 52; see also supra note 302 and accompanying text.
323. See, e.g., XYZ v. Schering Health Care Ltd., [2002] EWHC 1420 (Q.B.); Reay v.
British Nuclear Fuels, [1994] P.I.Q.R. P171 (Q.B.).
324. Schering Health Care, [2002] EWHC, ¶ 34; see also Reay, [1994] P.I.Q.R.
para. 178–207 (detailed assessment of epidemiological evidence in personal injury case
involving radiation exposure).
325. Smith v. McNair, [2008] CSOH 154 (Scot.); McTear v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd.,
[2005] CSOH 69 (Scot.); Dingley v. Chief Constable of Strathclyde (No. 1), (1998) S.C. 548
(Scot.).
326. Dingley, (1998) S.C. at 585.
327. Smith, [2008] CSOH 154, para. 24 (reviewing handling of complex evidence in
Dingley).
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commentators like O’Brian suggest will lead to “miscarriages of
328
To remedy this problem, O’Brian and others call for
justice.”
329
reliability assessment similar to a U.S.-style reliability test.
One approach, suggested by Tony Ward in English Law’s
Epistemology of Expert Testimony is to create a reliability test based on
330
another nation’s standard. He suggests the Australian test from R. v.
Bonython as the appropriate standard, and notes it has gained some
331
Ward suggests this test may offer
support in English decisions.
reliability standards, while preserving the relative roles of the judge and
332
jury. In Expert Evidence and Criminal Justice, Mike Redmayne looks
333
to Frye and Daubert as a model for U.K. reliability assessments. At
this point, however, it appears that no particular reliability standard
exists, and evidence gatekeeping is virtually nonexistent in the U.K.
One additional procedure that has recently been added to English
trial procedure involves the use of single experts, when the court deems
it appropriate. In certain cases, the court may request that a single
334
expert address an issue rather than each party address it separately.
The selection of the expert may be done by the parties or, if they cannot
335
agree, by the judge based on a list provided by the parties. While the
procedure may allow for single experts, the current use is mainly in
336
“routine cases where the claims involved are modest.” As for now, the
337
procedure is less likely to be applied in complex cases, but with the
rule there is the potential for a nonadversarial expert procedure in
complex cases in English courts.
With the creation of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in
328. O’Brian, supra note 312, at 184.
329. Id. at 181 (citing REDMAYNE, supra note 218, at 94–139); see also REDMAYNE,
supra note 218, at 98 & n.34 (“In this chapter I argue that English law should create a
reliability-based exclusionary rule for expert evidence.”).
330. Tony Ward, English Law’s Epistemology of Expert Testimony, 33 J.L. & SOC’Y 572
(2006).
331. Id. at 579–80 (quoting and discussing R. v. Bonython, (1984) 38 S.A. St. R. 45, 47,
which held that the court should assess if an opinion is “part of a body of knowledge or
experience which is sufficiently organized or recognized to be accepted as a reliable body of
knowledge or experience”).
332. Ward, supra note 330, at 595.
333. REDMAYNE, supra note 218, at 113–38; see also O’Brian, supra note 312, at 184.
334. CIV. PROC. R. 35.7 (Eng.).
335. Id. R. 35.7(2).
336. NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 109: EXPERT WITNESS 49–
50 (2005) (commenting on the English use of joint experts).
337. Id.
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2009, at least there is the potential for adoption of a single new standard
338
within the U.K., by common law development through precedent.
The Supreme Court—as the final court of appeal for all civil cases in the
U.K.—has jurisdiction to hear the appeals on those cases of “the
339
greatest public and constitutional importance.” It remains to be seen
if the new Supreme Court will take on the issue of expert testimony and
reliability standards.
The United Kingdom offers a contrast to the U.S. and Canadian
examples of evidentiary screening, both of which have some assessment
of reliability prior to admission of the evidence. While some case law
from the U.K. shows judicial skill in handling expert evidence at the
merits phase, the effect of minimal gatekeeping is an expertise free-forall, where all evidence gets admitted for consideration. The resulting
standards of admission mirror a debate on “junk science” that occurred
340
in the United States in the years leading to Daubert.
Having reviewed two common law systems, it appears that Canadian
judges may perform gatekeeping when unnecessary (in civil cases tried
341
to a judge), while English judges may not screen expert evidence when
342
it does seem helpful and appropriate (in criminal cases tried to a jury).
C. Civil Law Procedures Offer Appropriate Points of Comparison
In this Article’s review of expert procedures, other common-law
nations could be the sole examples used. And it is common for
338. Constitution Reform Act, 2005, c. 4 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/2005/4/pdfs/ukpga_20050004_en.pdf (describing the Act creating Supreme Court of
the United Kingdom). See generally The Supreme Court, JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE
PRIVY COUNCIL, http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/the-supreme-court.html (last visited
June 5, 2012).
339. Role of the Supreme Court, JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL,
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/role-of-the-supreme-court.html (last visited June 5,
2012).
340. See Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Trashing “Junk Science,” 1998 STAN. TECH L.
REV. 3, ¶¶ 4–8 (1998), http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/edmund-mercer-trashing-junk-science.pdf
(reviewing history of the junk science debate and discussing PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991)); see also CRANOR, supra note 113, at
46–47 (describing the perception of tort crisis in years prior to Daubert). In Daubert itself, the
Court specifically addressed the concern that abandonment of the Frye standard would result
in a “free-for-all” of junk science overwhelming judges and juries, deciding that conventional
legal tools like summary judgment, cross-examination, and careful instruction negate the
concern. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595–96 (1993).
341. See Chan v. Erin Mills Town Ctr., 2005 CarswellOnt 6741, paras. 30–33; text
accompanying notes 252–57.
342. See R. v. Robb, [1991] 93 Crim. App. R. 161; text accompanying notes 304–306.
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practitioners in common law systems to be unfamiliar with civil law
systems beyond the basics: it is foreign, code based, and non343
adversarial. These common limitations may result from attorneys in
American and other common law systems often learning solely points of
contrast between civil and common law, if they are exposed to civil law
344
Even with many differences between common and civil law
at all.
345
methods, they are not completely incompatible systems of law.
Borrowing from other legal systems has softened traditional
346
differences to some extent. Procedures that initially fit within civil law
347
may have a place in common law systems, and vice versa. If true, civil
law systems may offer some alternative procedures that could help fix
348
problems in expert witness rules in the United States. The handling of
expert witnesses seems likely to be an area particularly well suited to
349
transnational adoptions, as recognized by commentators such as
350
Langbein.
D. Germany
Before discussing specific reforms based on civil law procedures, this
Article will examine the role of the expert witness in civil law systems in
Germany and Japan. To start, review of expert witness procedures in
Germany provides an example of a system struggling with proper
balancing of reliability, assistance to the factfinder, and legal process.

343. JAMES G. APPLE & ROBERT P. DEYLING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., A PRIMER ON THE
CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 1 (1995).
344. Id.; see also Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad: Complexity and Convergence,
46 VILL. L. REV. 1, 4–11 (2001) (providing examples of areas of comparative difference
taught in United States).
345. Regarding the basic differences between systems, see APPLE & DEYLING, supra
note 344, at 35–38; and Peter Alldridge, Scientific Expertise and Comparative Criminal
Procedure, 3 INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 141, 143 (1999) (dismissing the categorization of the
two systems).
346. APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 343, at 39 (suggesting that “the distinctions between
the two systems have blurred” as one system adopts characteristics from the other).
347. See Alldridge, supra note 345, at 150–51 (noting two methodologies for reform of
common law legal systems originating from the civil law tradition, which are repeatedly
suggested by commentators).
348. Regarding the deficiencies in the handling of experts under Daubert, see supra
Parts II.B–.E. Regarding civil law as a source of law reform, see supra text accompanying
notes 9, 175–176.
349. Supra text accompanying notes 204–220.
350. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure, supra note 10, at 552; see also
Bryan, supra note 9, at 526; Haack, supra note 17, at 23.
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1. Basics of Judicial Structure and Tort Case Management in Germany
Because of significant differences from the U.S. system, it is
necessary to provide a brief description of the management of tort cases
351
in Germany, to place the expert role in context. To do so, this Article
will examine the basic structure of the judicial system in Germany, the
basis of tort liability under the German Civil Code, and then the
management of tort cases.
The judicial system in Germany is bifurcated between the courts of
352
Within
general jurisdiction and courts handling specialized issues.
individual German states, courts of general jurisdiction include two
basic courts, the Amtsgerichte, or lower-level courts, and the
353
Landgerichte, the first instance courts for larger claims. Most appeals
of the lower-level Amtsgerichte decisions occur at the Landgerichte,
while a higher-level appellate court—the Oberlandesgericht—hears
354
The highest appellate court is the
appeals from the Landgerichte.
Bundesgerichtshof, which may hear appeals from the Oberlandesgericht
355
Certain claims, such as
or, rarely, directly from the Landgerichte.
trademarks, labor and employment, or tax, have specialized courts and
356
appellate structures independent of the general-issue court system.
357
For complex tort litigation, the main courts involved would be the
Landgerichte in the first instance, with appeals at the
Oberlandesgericht.
General tort liability within the German legal system is based on
351. The specific issue of the expert witness within this system is handled separately. See
infra Part IV.D.2.
352. See generally GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
[GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 92–96; NIGEL G. FOSTER &
SATISH SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LAWS 66–79 (3d ed. 2002) (describing the general
structure of the German court system); Edward M. Andries, On the German Constitution’s
Fiftieth Anniversary: Jacques Maritain and the 1949 Basic Law (Grundgesetz), 13 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 1, 44 n.167 (1999).
353. FOSTER & SULE, supra note 352, at 69–71; ANKE FRECKMANN & THOMAS
WEGERICH, THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM 138–40 (1999). The statute currently sets the
dividing line between jurisdiction in the Amtsgerichte and the Landgerichte at 5,000. See
Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [GVG] [Court organizational statute], Sept. 12, 1950,
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I], at 455, as amended, July 12, 2011, BGBl. I. at 2582, § 23
¶ 1, 74; FOSTER & SULE, supra, note 352, at 69–70.
354. FRECKMANN & WEGERICH, supra note 353, at 140.
355. Id.
356. Allen et al., A Plea, supra note 178, at 713–14; Langbein, The German Advantage,
supra note 57, at 851–52.
357. See supra text accompanying notes 30–31.
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several code provisions of the German Civil Code—the Bürgerliche
358
Gesetzbuch (BGB). Written in the late 19th century with an effective
date of 1900, the code establishes a series of duties, violation of which
359
The BGB provision on general duties
may result in civil liability.
holds that “[a] person who intentionally or negligently injures the life,
body, health, freedom, property or other right of another unlawfully is
360
obliged to compensate the other for the harm arising from this.” In
addition, liability may attach to one who offends a specific civil code
361
provision established for another’s protection, so long as there is fault.
Intentional acts also may result in liability under a separate code
362
In addition to the general provisions, the code contains
provision.
363
many subject-specific provisions establishing duty.
Should a person violate a duty and be found liable, he must pay
damages to “restore the position that would exist if the circumstance
364
obliging him to pay damages had not occurred.” The loser in litigation
also pays the costs of the litigation, including court costs and attorney’s
365
With regard to complex torts—which often involve
fees.
pharmaceutical or products liability claims—the German system does
not contain provisions equivalent to a general “class action” lawsuit, as

358. BASIL S. MARKESINIS & HANNES UNBERATH, THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS: A
COMPARATIVE TREATISE 24–26 (4th ed. 2002); CEES VAN DAM, EUROPEAN TORT LAW 61
(2006).
359. Harald Koch, The Law of Torts, in INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 205, 207–21
(Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2d ed. 2005); MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra
note 358, at 24–26 (suggesting that BGB civil code provisions may establish tort liability).
360. Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], Aug. 18, 1896, Reichsgesetzblatt
[RGBl.] 195, as amended, § 823 para. 1), translated in RAYMOND YOUNGS, SOURCEBOOK ON
GERMAN LAW 435 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter BGB].
361. Id. § 823, para 2.
362. Id. § 826; see also VAN DAM, supra note 358, at 70 (discussing BGB § 826).
363. See, e.g., VAN DAM, supra note 358, at 67 (discussing BGB § 824 (financial
trustworthiness), BGB § 825 (infringement on sexual integrity), and BGB § 839 (breach of
official duty)).
364. BGB § 249; see also Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Why No “Efficient Breach” in the Civil
Law?: A Comparative Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract, 55 AM. J.
COMP. L. 721, 744 (2007) (discussing damages provisions in Germany).
365. Astrid Stadler & Wolfgang Hau, The Law of Civil Procedure, in INTRODUCTION
TO GERMAN LAW, supra note 359, at 365, 377 (citing Zivilprozeβordnung [ZPO] [German
Code of Civil Procedure], Jan. 30, 1877, RGBl. at 83, § 91, translated in GERMAN
COMMERCIAL CODE & CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, IN ENGLISH (Charles E. Stewart trans.,
2001) [hereinafter ZPO]); FRECKMANN & WEGERICH, supra note 353, at 170. The payment
can be divided with a partial verdict for both parties. FRECKMANN & WEGERICH, supra, at
170 (citing ZPO § 92).
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in American law.366 Without mass tort methodologies, each claimant
must prove his or her damages independently, and risk having to pay
367
costs.
In addition to court structures and claim bases, the third necessary
area to review is the procedural management of tort claims in German
courts, particularly the Landgerichte. A legal claim begins in Germany,
as in the United States, with the filing of a complaint that includes a
368
theory of recovery and a request for relief. From this similar starting
point, however, the case management structure diverges from typical
U.S. procedures, in that the judge alone becomes the manager of the
369
Initially, the Plaintiff’s complaint—and the
case and factfinder.
Defendant’s response—must allege not only the basic theory of liability,
370
but also the “means of proof for its main factual contentions.” Only
after the exchange of initial documents, and an initial determination that
the claim could—if all the facts are proven as alleged—result in liability,
will the judge begin the process of collecting, and then evaluating, the
371
evidence. The judge’s role is to do “justice between the parties; it is
not to ascertain some independent truth,” but the court is also to
determine what is true based on evidence suggested by the parties for
372
judicial review.
When the judge is collecting evidence in the case, there is not a clear
distinction between “trial” and “discovery.” All collection of evidence
366. William B. Fisch, European Analogues to the Class Action: Group Action in France
and Germany, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 51, 75–78 (1979); Mullenix, supra note 344, at 7 (noting that
there is no German-law provision for representing class interests (citing Harald Koch, Class
and Public Interest Actions in German Law, 5 CIV. JUST. Q. 66, 77 (1986))); Gerhard Walter,
Mass Tort Litigation in Germany and Switzerland, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 369, 372–73
(2001).
367. One exception to this rule is that individual cases may be joined if they involve the
same or essentially similar factual or legal grounds, but each party remains an active
participant. Fisch, supra note 366, at 75. Another exception occurs when private claimants
associate with a criminal prosecution for payment of claims. Id. at 71–74 (noting Thalidomide
litigation example).
368. Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 827.
369. Compare this to the rate of bench trials in torts in U.S. District Court, infra text
accompanying note 487—currently fewer than 30%.
370. Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 827 (citing ZPO § 130,
para. 5); see also Burkhard Bastuck & Burkard Göpfert, Admission and Presentation of
Evidence in Germany, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 609, 610–11 (1994).
371. FRECKMANN & WEGERICH, supra note 353, at 146.
372. Hein Kötz, Civil Justice Systems in Europe and the United States, 11 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 61, 66–67 (2003) (rejecting idealization of the German system as inquisitorial,
without adversarial influences).
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in Germany, including examination of witnesses, is part of the process
373
leading to judgment. One additional contrast to the American system
involves the German judicial role, which is more active than the
American judicial role in the selection of which order to address issues
in the case, the examination of the witnesses, and the selection of an
374
expert witness, if needed, after consulting with the parties.
Witness examination involves the judge asking questions, and then
allowing an opportunity for the parties to follow-up with additional
examination, without the cross-examination that is universal in U.S.
375
courts. Witness testimony is not recorded or transcribed, but “rather,
the judge pauses from time to time to dictate a summary of the
376
testimony” for the court file. Through a series of hearings as needed,
the judge will collect summaries of witness testimony and other evidence
377
for the court’s file. The court file is the official case record to be used
378
During or
in issuing judgments and, if applicable, for any appeals.
after the period of evidence collection, the court can issue a judgment if
a claim is established or rejected, or for other case management
379
German courts, therefore, can dismiss claims or cases on
purposes.
procedural grounds at any stage when the evidence shows a claim is
380
unsubstantiated.
Within the constraints of the German legal system, expert witnesses
operate to assist the court in the determination of the case.
2. The Role and Function of Experts Within the German Legal System
An expert witness in Germany fulfills the same function as in the
United States—providing the decisionmaker with information of a

373. See id. at 72 (crediting this structure to the absence of juries in German civil
litigation, which eliminates the need for all evidence to be heard at once).
374. Id. at 63–64.
375. See Kötz, supra note 372, at 63; see also Langbein, The German Advantage, supra
note 57, at 828.
376. Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 828.
377. Id.; Kötz, supra note 372, at 64.
378. Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 828.
379. FRECKMANN & WEGERICH, supra note 353, at 161–63.
380. Id.; see also Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87
GEO. L.J. 1983, 2008 (1999) (“By taking testimony on particular issues, rather than taking the
testimony for the entire case during a single trial, an inquisitorial court can focus initially on
those issues most likely to be dispositive.”); Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57,
at 830 (finding that “in German procedure the court ranges over the entire case, constantly
looking for the jugular—for the issue of law or fact that may dispose of the case”).
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scientific or technical nature to assist in resolution of the claim. Yet,
because of varying case management procedures, an individual expert
witness in Germany has more influence over the case resolution than his
or her counterpart in the United States. The role is not limitless,
however, and the German courts have ways to balance the scientific
expertise with necessary limits of legal process.
After both parties make claims in the pleadings stage of the case, the
judge must determine whether an expert will be necessary to decide a
381
contested issue. If so, the judge will appoint an expert to assist him or
382
her in the determination of the contested issue. To determine who to
select, the judge may request the parties to nominate an expert, but
383
more often will select the expert himself or herself. Once selected, the
expert’s role is to assist the court to resolve the issues on which technical
384
or scientific information is required.
After choosing an expert, the court “propound[s] the facts that [the
expert] is to assume or to investigate, and . . . fram[es] the questions that
385
the court wishes the expert to address.” Once instructed, the expert
should examine all issues necessary to render an opinion, within the
386
scope of his or her expertise and the court’s direction. An expert has a
duty to assess the case neutrally, with a commitment to finding the
387
truth. After review, the expert often prepares a written report for the
388
court, explaining his or her opinion on the issues presented. Once the
381. Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 837.
382. Id.
383. Id.; see also Timmerbeil, supra note 218, at 173–74; Bastuck & Göpfert, supra note
370, at 616.
384. Kötz, supra note 372, at 64 (demonstrating that an expert serves to “assist the court
to the best of [the expert’s] ability in reaching a correct result”); Stadler & Hau, supra note
367, at 374 (stating that the expert’s task is “to help the judge to ascertain facts . . . based on
their expert knowledge”); see also Wolfgang Zeidler, Court Practice and Procedure Under
Strain: A Comparison, 8 ADEL. L. REV. 150, 156 (1983) (concluding that German experts
serve as neutral assistants to the court, to supply the court with technical knowledge not
otherwise available to the court).
385. Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 839; see also ZPO, Jan. 30,
1877, RGBL. at 83, § 403 (“The evidence shall be presented by designation of the points
requiring expert opinion.”); ZPO § 404a, para. 3 (“In cases of disputed facts, the court shall
determine the facts on which the expert is to base his or her report.”).
386. ZPO § 404a, para. 4 (court directions limit expert ability to investigate facts).
387. ZPO § 410, para. 1, sentence 2 (oath to perform duty to the expert’s best knowledge
and conscience).
388. Bastuck & Göpfert, supra note 370, at 616 (suggesting that “[m]ost expert opinions
are submitted to the court in writing”); Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at
839 (“The expert is ordinarily instructed to prepare a written opinion.” (citing ZPO § 411,
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report is filed, the court may call the expert to testify or to answer
389
questions on his or her findings. After the court takes oral testimony,
it enters the opinion and a summary of testimony into the court’s file,
390
In a vast majority of
and then may rely on it in deciding the claim.
391
cases, the court follows the expert opinion of the court’s expert.
Within the scope of these rules, there are few methods that a litigant
can use to challenge an expert’s conclusions. Initially, a party can
challenge the expert under the high standard of recusal for lack of
392
Once an expert issues a report, the court may call the
neutrality.
witness to testify; while most of the questioning is done by the court, the
393
parties may ask questions to clarify testimony. After the initial report
and testimony, a party may—if asserting the initial expert is
unconvincing—request the court appoint a new expert, although it is
394
solely within the judge’s discretion to do so. Even if the court refuses
to appoint a second expert, a party may offer a private expert to
395
A final
supplement the record and provide an additional opinion.
method to challenge the expert’s opinions would be by appeal, as the
para. 1, allowing written opinions)).
389. Bastuck & Göpfert, supra note 370, at 616; Langbein, The German Advantage,
supra note 57, at 839; see also ZPO § 411, para. 3 (“The court may order the appearance of
the expert to explain his or her written opinion.”).
390. Timmerbeil, supra note 218, at 175.
391. Id. at 175–76 (suggesting that judges are unlikely to reject expert report as courts
lack scientific knowledge in expert fields); see also id. at 176 n.83 (citing Horst Sendler,
Richter und Sachverständige, NJW, Nov. 18, 1986, at 2907, 2909 (describing research finding
that courts follow experts 95% of the time)).
392. Id. at 174 (citing ZPO §§ 42–45 (describing recusal standards for judges) and ZPO
§ 406 (concluding that the judicial recusal rule applies to experts)).
393. Id. at 175 (citing ZPO § 411, para. 3, which states, “The court may order the
appearance of the expert to explain his or her written opinion”); Kötz, supra note 372, at 64;
Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 839. Timmerbeil explains this is not
American-style cross-examination, but “polite questioning in a non-confrontational
atmosphere.” Timmerbeil, supra note 218, at 175.
394. Timmerbeil, supra note 218, at 175 (discussing ZPO § 412, para. 1, which states
“The court may order that the same or another expert render a new expert opinion in the
event that it considers that the expert opinion is inadequate”); Langbein, The German
Advantage, supra note 57, at 839. Langbein notes this would be done in cases where the
initial report is “sloppy or partial, [such] that it rests upon a view of the field that is not
generally shared, or that the question referred to the expert is exceptionally difficult.”
Langbein, The German Advantage, supra, at 840 (citing KURT JESSNITZER, DER
GERICHTLICHE SACHVERSTÄNDIGE 231–32 (7th ed. 1978)).
395. Timmerbeil, supra note 218, at 177–78 (noting that private experts do not have the
“same value” as the court’s expert, as their conclusions are assertions of the party, not
evidence); Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 840 (court discounts party
expert for want of neutrality).
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litigant challenges the judgment on a claim of legal or factual error.396
With so few methods to challenge, the expert role has been criticized
397
in Germany as being one of “de facto decision-maker” for the judge.
Necessarily without knowledge to decide the issue requiring technical
398
expertise, the judge is ill-suited to challenge the report of an expert.
Because the judge is unable to challenge the expert in the field of
expertise, the acceptance rate of expert opinion by the judges exceeds
399
The high level of influence the court’s expert has on cases
90%!
makes the selection of an expert essential to preserving legitimacy of the
process, by ensuring selection of an expert who the parties will accept as
400
fair.
A German judge faced with the issue of selection of an expert in a
complex tort follows certain procedures to ensure a qualified expert.
Initially, the judge may consult with the parties on who is to be selected,
401
and if the parties agree, the judge must appoint that expert. Barring
agreement, the judge will need assistance to select someone who is
skilled in a field differing from the judge’s own. In Germany, the official
regulatory agency overseeing licensed professionals maintains lists of
402
For other
persons “deemed especially suited to serve as experts.”
fields, the state may delegate to the relevant trade or industry group the
responsibility of maintaining the list of appropriate and qualified
396. Regarding the procedure for appeals in Germany, see Stadler & Hau, supra note
365, at 377–78; FOSTER & SULE, supra note 352, at 133–34 (citing ZPO § 538, allowing appeal
for a defect in the underlying judgment); and Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note
57, at 855–57 (reviewing German appellate procedure). Regarding appeals and experts, see
Timmerbeil, supra note 218, at 174 (appeal of final judgment allows appeal of expert issues).
397. Timmerbeil, supra note 218, at 180 (citation omitted); see also Allen et al., A Plea,
supra note 178, at 738 (concern that experts become “secret judges”); Neil Netanel
Weinstock, Expert Opinion and Reform in Anglo-American, Continental, and Israeli
Adjudication, 10 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 9, 40 (1986) (“Continental judges have
been criticized frequently for using the expertise procedure as a means to delegate their
judicial responsibilities.”).
398. Timmerbeil, supra note 218, at 175–76, 180; Weinstock, supra note 397, at 42
(noting that civil law judges lack technical training to challenge expert reports). Other
criticisms include the debate over the role of experts vis-à-vis the court, per Allen et al., A
Plea, supra note 178, at 738, or the court using experts to reach results already decided upon
by the judge, per Coester & Markesinis, supra note 211, at 306.
399. See supra note 391 (and sources cited); Weinstock, supra note 397, at 42.
400. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS 316–46, 477–85 (1995).
401. Timmerbeil, supra note 218, at 174 (citing ZPO § 404, para. 4).
402. Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 837–38 (methodology of
expert list creation).
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experts.403 Both the professional list and the trade or industry list will be
available to the judges when the need for an expert arises, allowing for a
selection of a person well qualified and respected among his or her
404
peers.
While the German expert system is not without criticism, it has stuck
a balance between the need for scientific and technical expertise, the
parties’ ability to challenge expertise, efficiency, and the legitimacy of
litigation outcomes. These decisions provide contrast to the Americanstyle adversarial expert system.
E. Japan
If Germany provides a basic and long-standing example of a civil law
system handling scientific expertise, then Japanese management of
expert witnesses serves as an example of a civil law nation
experimenting with reform. Japan serves as an interesting counterpoint
to Germany because, in addition to the reforms, German models have
405
significantly influenced the Japanese judicial system.
1. Basics of Judicial Structure and Tort Case Management in Japan
To examine the role of the expert witness in Japan in detail, this
Article will first—as with Germany—examine the overall structure of
the judicial system in Japan, the bases of tort liability under the Japanese
Civil Code, and case management of torts within that system. Only after
reviewing those areas will the expert witness role, and the balancing of
scientific and technical expertise with legal process, be examined in
detail.
Like the German system, the Japanese legal system has two levels of
courts for civil claims, based on the amount in dispute. Lower-level
403. Id. (noting that the list is compiled of qualified experts, who also swear to render
impartial assistance). Regarding experts’ duty to render impartial advice, see supra text
accompanying notes 271–274 (addressing same issue in Canada and the United States), and
note 384 (finding that German experts are obligated to render impartial, objective opinions);
see also Bastuck & Göpfert, supra note 370, at 616.
404. Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 837–38.
405. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 50 (stating that Japanese prewar
jurisprudence “was completely dominated by the German approach”); Takeshi Kojima,
Japanese Civil Procedure in Comparative Law Perspective, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 687, 689
(1998) (“Basic Japanese civil procedure is patterned mainly upon German civil procedure.”);
Shozo Ota, Reform of Civil Procedure in Japan, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 561, 563–64 (2001)
(describing Japanese civil procedure based on German codes). Regarding the development
of prewar Japanese law, see GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra, at 25–75.
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claims with disputed claims under ¥1,400,000 are heard by a Summary
406
Summary Courts are intended to provide streamlined
Court.
407
procedures for efficient adjudication of smaller disputes. For disputes
408
Analogous to
involving larger sums, Japan uses District Courts.
German Landgerichte, Japanese District Courts serve as first instance
venue for claims over ¥1,400,000 but also as an appellate court for cases
409
heard at a Summary Court. A case appealed from the District Court
410
will be heard at the High Court, with a final appeal to the Supreme
411
Court of Japan. Also analogous to the German system, some claims—
family or domestic issues, patent disputes, trade, or labor—use
specialized courts or administrative review processes independent of the
412
In the context of complex tort
courts of general jurisdiction.
406. Saibansho Ho [Court Organization Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 33(1)(i) (Japan),
available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=5&re=02&dn=1&gn=99
&sy=1947&ht=A&no=&x=40&y=14&ky=&page=10. The value of ¥1,400,000 is slightly over
$17,000 U.S.; this is based on the current exchange rate of 82 Yen to 1 U.S. Dollar. Exchange
Rates: New York Closing Snapshot, WALL ST. J., available at http://online.wsj.com/mdc/
public/page/2_3021-forex.html (last visited June 5, 2012).
407. MERYLL DEAN, JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 346–47 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining the
specific procedures that allow for efficient handling through the court system).
408. Id. at 348.
409. Saibansho Ho [Court Organization Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 24 (setting
District Court jurisdiction); DEAN, supra note 407, at 348; GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note
218, at 240–41.
410. DEAN, supra note 407, at 351; GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 237. Note
also that in rare instances, a case in Summary Court may “leapfrog” to the High Court
without intermediate appeal to the District Court. DEAN, supra, at 352; see also GOODMAN,
JUSTICE, supra, at 237.
411. DEAN, supra note 407, at 352. Like a Summary Court appeal skipping the District
Court and going to the High Court instead, a District Court case may—in rare instances—
skip the High Court level and be heard at the Supreme Court. Id. at 352–53, 365.
412. See generally CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 162–67 (2d rev. ed. 2008) [hereinafter GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW] (describing
the Japanese legal system); Akira Mikazuki, Saibansho Seido (Judicial System), in THE
JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: INTRODUCTORY CASES AND MATERIALS 444, 453–58 (Hideo
Tanaka ed., 1976) (same). Regarding family court, see DEAN, supra note 407, at 349–51;
YOSIYUKI NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 129–32 (Anthony H. Angelo ed.,
trans., 1976) (describing the different agencies of the district courts, as well as family and
summary courts). Regarding patent courts, see GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 238;
Yoshinobu Someno & Keiko Someno, Patent Office and Court Procedures in Japan, in
PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 110, 120–21
(Teruo Doi & Warren L. Shattuck eds., 1977) (describing the adjudication of patent denials);
Yasuhei Taniguchi, The 1996 Code of Civil Procedure of Japan—A Procedure for the Coming
Century?, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 767, 782 (1997) (describing special venue for patent litigation).
Regarding trade disputes, see MITSUO MATSUSHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
COMPETITION LAW IN JAPAN 98–116 (1993) (describing the Fair Trade Commission
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litigation,413 the initial court involved would usually be the District
Court, followed by appellate assessment at the High Court level.
Japan’s legal system bases its general tort liability in its Civil Code,
414
As with the
which was initially based on the German Civil Code.
German code, the Japanese Civil Code—the Minpō—contains a general
provision on tort liability, declaring “A person who has intentionally or
negligently infringed upon any right of others, or legally protected
interest of others, shall be liable to compensate any damages resulting in
415
In addition to the general provision, the code also
consequence.”
provides for subject-specific provisions establishing duty for specific
416
situations.
If a claimant establishes a violation of the civil code provisions, then
the defendant must pay damages. Damages in Japan include monetary
payment to compensate for losses resulting from the wrong, and may
417
but not punitive
include compensation for pain and suffering,
418
Just as with the German system, the Japanese Civil Code
damages.
419
contains no general “class action” procedure similar to U.S. law,
420
meaning that each claimant must file suit to prove his or her damages.
procedures). Regarding labor courts, see GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 244–45.
More detailed review of specialized courts is beyond the scope of this Article.
413. See supra text accompanying notes 30–31.
414. Eri Osaka, Reevaluating the Role of the Tort Liability System in Japan, 26 ARIZ. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 394 (2009); Eric A. Feldman, Essay, Law, Society, and Medical
Malpractice Litigation in Japan, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 257, 262 (2009). See
generally Ronald Frank, Law of Obligations, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868, at
227, 234–36 (Wilhelm Rohl ed., 2005) (describing law of obligations in civil code; obligations
are “a right to claim performance or omission of a definite act from a definite person” and
civil code provides remedies for non-performance).
[MINPO]
[CIV.
C.],
art.
709,
available
at
415. MINPŌ
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?printID=&printID=&re=02&ky=gratuito
usly&page=3&vm=02.
416. See, e.g., id. arts. 715 (revealing the liability of employers), 717 (revealing the
liability of landowner), 718 (revealing the liability of possessor of an animal), 723
(defamation), available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?printID=&prin
tID=&re=02&ky=gratuitously&page=3&vm=02 (last visited December 20, 2010).
417. Id. art. 722 para. 1; GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 371; Osaka, supra note
414, at 395.
418. Osaka, supra note 414, at 395–96. This policy extends to prohibiting enforcement
of foreign punitive damages awards. Id. at 395 & n.12; see also GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra
note 218, at 373 (noting that Japan does not permit punitive damages).
419. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 414. Goodman explains that there is a new
“representative action” available under Japan’s 1996 code, but it contains limits on claims
inconsistent with American class actions. Id. at 414–15.
420. Regarding other reasons why Japan has few tort claims when compared to the
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Even without class actions amalgamating claims, the total amount of
litigation in Japan is relatively small. In 2008, the total number of
pending civil claims in Japanese District Courts was nearly 110,000, after
approximately 220,000 cases had been filed and a similar number had
421
Unlike many other nations, Japan has adopted the
been resolved.
422
American Rule, where parties each pay their own attorneys.
Commentators suggest—since the explanation of a “loser pays” system
is not possible—there are other bases for low litigation rates in Japan,
including: few attorneys, high court filing fees, small damage awards,
slow-paced litigation, high burdens of proof, and prevalence of
423
These factors mean that few cases
Alternative Dispute Resolution.
United States, see infra note 423 and accompanying text.
421. SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, STATISTICAL TABLES 2004–2008, available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/info/statistical_table/index.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2012).
This compares to approximately 271,000 civil cases pending in U.S. Federal District Court in
2008, with approximately 245,000 filings and approximately 238,000 terminations. ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS, at tbl.C (2008)
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2008
/tables/C00Mar08.pdf. This number does not include the case loads of the state courts; for
those, see R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., EXAMINING THE WORK OF
STATE COURTS: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 1–9
(2009) (describing civil caseload statistics for 2007 spanning various states and subject
matters).
422. Carl F. Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure Code: Has It Fostered a Rule of
Law Dispute Mechanism?, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 511, 532 n.87 (2004) [hereinafter Goodman,
Japan’s New Civil Procedure] (citing TAKAAKI HATTORI & DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN JAPAN REVISED, at § 2.04(3) (2002)). See generally Matthew J. Wilson,
Failed Attempt to Undermine the Third Wave: Attorney Fee Shifting Movement in Japan, 19
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1457 (2005) (evaluating and explaining why attorney fee-shifting
movement has failed in Japan). Compare the above sources with the German rules, supra
note 365 and accompanying text, and those in England, supra note 298 and accompanying
text.
423. See generally John Owen Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE
STUD. 359 (1978) (describing that judicial system fees and delays result in low litigation
prevalence rates); J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement
Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263 (1989) (finding that low
litigation prevalence rates are related to encouragement of settlement); Nobutoshi
Yamanouchi & Samuel J. Cohen, Understanding the Incidence of Litigation in Japan: A
Structural Analysis, 25 INT’L LAW. 443 (1991) (noting low litigation prevalence rates related
to the structure of Japanese civil system).
Regarding the effects of the number of attorneys in Japan, see Edward I. Chen, The
National Law Examination in Japan, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 20–21 (1989); Feldman, supra
note 414, at 266–67; Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure, supra note 422, at 526; Elliott J.
Hahn, An Overview of the Japanese Legal System, 5 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 517, 522–31
(1983); and Yoichiro Hamabe, Changing Antimonopoly Policy in the Japanese Legal
System—An International Perspective, 28 INT’L LAW. 903, 904 (1994).
Regarding the effect of high court filing fees, see Mark A. Behrens & Daniel H.
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will be filed, and fewer still result in trial.
In addition to court structures and claim bases, the third necessary
area to review is the procedural management of torts claims filed in
Japanese District Courts, from filing to trial. As with all the legal
systems discussed, a case begins when the claimant files his or her
424
Complaint. The Complaint must specify in detail not only the nature
of the claim, but the facts necessary to support the claims, and must
425
After review to determine whether
include documentary evidence.
the Complaint states a cognizable claim for relief, the judge will serve
426
Following the Defendant’s filing of an Answer, the
the Defendant.
court may set hearings to clarify the positions of the parties, or to
427
encourage ADR or other compromise. After these initial procedures,
Raddock, Japan’s New Product Liability Law: The Citadel of Strict Liability Falls, but Access
to Recovery Is Limited by Formidable Barriers, 16 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 669, 711 (1996);
Feldman, supra note 414, at 264–65 & tbl.2 (containing a table explaining the fee structure in
detail); Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure, supra note 422, at 526; and Yamanouchi &
Cohen, supra, at 453.
Regarding the effect of low damage awards, see Behrens & Raddock, supra, at 711–17;
Feldman, supra note 414, at 265–66; and Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure, supra note
422, at 526–27 (citing JOSEPH W.S. DAVIS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN JAPAN 279 (1996)).
Regarding the effect of the slow pace of litigation, see Behrens & Raddock, supra, at
705–06; Feldman, supra note 414, at 268–70 (describing the “languid pace of trials”);
Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure, supra note 422, at 527; Kojima, supra note 405, at
689–90; and Ota, supra note 405, at 565.
Regarding the effect of the high burden of proof, see GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note
218, at 324–25; Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of Proof in Japan and the United States, 37
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 263, 265–66 (2004) (noting that burden of proof remains well above
preponderance of the evidence, but less than beyond a reasonable doubt: a “high
probability”); Feldman, supra note 414, at 263; Kojima, supra note 405, at 708; and Osaka,
supra note 414, at 394–95.
Regarding the prevalence of ADR, see DEAN, supra note 407, at 356–61 (containing a
detailed review of the role of ADR in Japan and noting that structures of ADR are “long
established, entrenched and well used within the modern legal system”); Goodman, Japan’s
New Civil Procedure, supra note 422, at 527; and Mathias Reimann, Liability for Defective
Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?,
51 AM. J. COMP. L. 751, 815 (2003).
424. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 270; Kojima, supra note 405, at 697.
425. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 270–71 (citing MINJI SOSH-O KISOHU
[Japanese Rules of Civil Procedure], art. 53); Kojima, supra note 405, at 697.
426. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 272–73; Kojima, supra note 405, at 697. If
the complaint lacks a basis for relief, the court may reject the initial filing and provide the
Plaintiff a chance to revise the pleading. Id.; see also GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra, at 273
(citing MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 137 (Japan)).
427. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 277; Kojima, supra note 405, at 699–706
(explaining plenary hearing procedure, preparation, and the authority of court to order
preparatory hearings prior to the plenary hearings).
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the court moves the case to the evidence stage.
As with the German system, in Japan the judge is the primary case
manager, and there is no clear dividing line between trial and discovery,
428
because all hearings are part of the process leading to judgment.
Rather, the judge will organize the schedule for the presentation of the
429
evidence, indicating in what order issues will be reviewed. Hearings
430
witness
involve the presentation of documentary evidence,
431
432
433
testimony, party testimony, and expert opinion.
Once the court decides that it can decide a claim, the court will issue
a judgment affirming or rejecting a party’s claim based on the
434
evidence. Each judgment includes a statement of findings of fact, the
435
If some part of the case
bases for those conclusions, and the result.
still remains in dispute after the judgment, the case continues in that
436
area.
Within the constraints of the Japanese legal system, expert witnesses
operate to assist the court in the determination of the case.
2. The Role and Function of Experts Within the Japanese Legal
System
With a civil code based on the German code, and similar judge-led
case management, one might be tempted to assume that the role of

428. Kojima, supra note 405, at 689; Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure, supra note
422, at 536–38. Regarding the German similarity here, see supra note 373 and accompanying
text.
429. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 320–21; see also GOODMAN, THE RULE OF
LAW, supra note 412, at 347–48 (“This is, after all, an inquisition with the judge in control and
responsible for clarifying the case; as well as gathering the evidence; as well as making a
correct determination in the case.”).
430. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 327–51; Goodman, Japan’s New Civil
Procedure, supra note 422, at 541–42; Kojima, supra note 405, at 707–08 (describing the
court’s handling of documentary evidence).
431. This is if the court decides witnesses are necessary. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra
note 218, at 351–63; Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure, supra note 422, at 541–42;
Kojima, supra note 405, at 706–07.
432. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 361–63; Kojima, supra note 405, at 707.
433. Like witnesses, an expert will be called to provide an opinion only if necessary.
GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 364; Kojima, supra note 405, at 707.
434. Kojima, supra note 405, at 708–10; see also GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at
417.
435. Kojima, supra note 405, at 709 (citing MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.]
1996, art. 253 (Japan)); see also GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 418.
436. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 421.
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experts in Japan is closely similar to the role in Germany.437 Yet even if
the expert role is only roughly similar, the justice system has recently
incorporated changes to the law to improve expert witness procedures.
With these new procedures, examination of the Japanese system,
Professor Feldman argues, “ought to be the first step in the much438
needed reform of the U.S. expert witness system.”
Experts are called by, and asked to assist, the judge in making his or
439
her determinations in the case, when necessary. Procedurally, a party
makes a motion for the court to appoint an expert to help establish a
fact needed to prove a claim, and the court will decide whether expert
440
opinion is required. If the court decides an expert is needed, it selects
441
the expert and provides him or her with the necessary case materials
442
Once the expert is
to help decide the contested expert issue.
appointed, he or she is required to report his or her opinions to the
court, usually by a written report but sometimes in oral testimony as
443
As is the case in Germany, the opinions of court-appointed
well.
444
experts often hold great influence with the judge.
437. Regarding expert witnesses in Germany, see supra Part IV.D.2.
438. Eric A. Feldman, Law Across Borders: What Can the United States Learn from
Japan?, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 795, 800 (2009).
439. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 366; TAKAAKI HATTORI & DAN FENNO
HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN § 7.06[5][a] (Yasuhei Taniguchi, Pauline C.
Reich & Hiroto Miyake eds., rev. 2d ed. 2009) (“The role of an expert is to supplement the
judge’s ability to decide the case by giving an opinion based on his/her special knowledge and
experience.”); Kojima, supra note 405, at 707; see also Ichiro Otaka, Recent Developments
Regarding the Intellectual Property High Court of Japan, Address Before the 14th Annual
Conf. on Int’l Intellectual Prop. Law & Pol’y 5 (2006), available at http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/
documents/pdf/thesis/060420_21.pdf (describing the same, regarding expert commissioners).
440. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 364 (citing MINJI SOSH-O KISOHU
[Japanese Rules of Civil Procedure], art. 129); Feldman, supra note 414, at 270.
441. HATTORI & HENDERSON, supra note 439, § 7.06[5][a] (citing MINJI SOSHŌHŌ
[MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 213 (Japan)) (noting that the judge selects the expert).
On the details of expert selection, see infra text accompanying notes 458–473.
442. Feldman, supra note 414, at 271.
443. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 364; HATTORI & HENDERSON, supra note
439, § 7.06[5][b] (citing MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 215(1)); Feldman,
supra note 414, at 271.
444. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 296, 364 (“It is likely that the court will rely
on the neutral expert appointed by the court rather than on a paid expert witness hired by the
parties.”). The judicial acceptance of expert opinions at high levels appears to occur in many
civil law nations. Regarding the same issue in Germany, see Sendler, supra note 391 (finding
that experts followed in 95% of cases), and in France, see JOHN BELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF
FRENCH LAW 108 (2d ed. 2008); Robert F. Taylor, A Comparative Study of Expert Testimony
in France and the United States: Philosophical Underpinnings, History, Practice, and
Procedure, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 181, 209 (1996) (suggesting that “it is difficult for a judge to
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A litigant attempting to challenge a report from the court-appointed
expert may do so in several ways. Initially, the litigant may contest the
445
appointment of the individual chosen as the expert. Such challenges
involve demonstrating to the court that circumstances prevent the
446
individual selected from being impartial. The challenge may involve
the expert being unable to “faithfully” give his or her opinion, meaning
447
This is a very high burden to successfully
that the expert is biased.
448
Second, a litigant may cast doubt on an expert
challenge an expert.
opinion by directly questioning the expert. For those experts that the
court calls to testify orally, the litigants may ask questions after the
449
Beyond oral examination, litigants may also
court’s questioning.
submit written questions to experts, not unlike interrogatories in
450
Finally, beyond initial challenges and
American discovery.
questioning, a litigant may also retain a party-expert to address the same
451
issue. While the litigant must make a motion with the court to have
452
the party-expert’s opinion heard, directly challenging the court’s
expert with a private expert remains an important method to cast doubt
453
Even with these methods to challenge
on the court’s expert report.
expert opinion, the single court-appointed expert retains substantial
influence with the court as its neutral expert technician.
contradict an expert in that expert’s area of expertise, without relying on the opinions of
other experts”); and William J. Travis, Impartial Expert Testimony Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence: A French Perspective, 8 INT’L LAW. 492, 520 (1974) (noting that “French courts
have accorded excessive credibility to the reports of court appointed experts”).
445. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 364; HATTORI & HENDERSON, supra note
439, § 7.06[5][a].
446. HATTORI & HENDERSON, supra note 439, § 7.06[5][a] (citing MINJI SOSHŌHŌ
[MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 214(1)).
447. MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 214(1).
448. Note that, in appointing a particular expert, the judge “has impliedly decided that
the expert advice sought meets the reliability and professional standards set in Daubert.”
Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure, supra note 422, at 597 n.332.
449. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 364; Feldman, supra note 414, at 271; see
also MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 215-2(2).
450. Feldman, supra note 414, at 271 (“Parties could submit written questions and seek
clarification of written reports.”).
451. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 363–64; Feldman, supra note 414, at 270;
see also HATTORI & HENDERSON, supra note 439, § 7.06[5][a].
452. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 364.
453. Again, the likelihood of success here appears low: “A judge is unlikely to permit
such a contradicting witness because to do so would both sanction a challenge to a colleague
and take additional time in trial.” Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure, supra note 422, at
597.
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As in German civil litigation, the few opportunities to challenge the
454
expert after appointment and the high rate of acceptance of opinions
result in a critical need for fairness in the expert selection process, to
455
preserve legitimacy. In Germany, this need for fairness has led to the
development of professional lists of persons screened to serve as
456
In Japan, the judiciary has not traditionally created similar
experts.
457
Instead, before recent reforms in 2004, the selection process
lists.
involved several procedures, including asking for assistance from
458
Then the court
professional societies or from university scientists.
would proceed with party-led expert selection involving multiple
459
The traditional expert selection
challenges and reconsideration.
method, averaging 133 days for an expert to be recruited by a court, was
460
felt to be inefficient.
In 2001, out of a growing dissatisfaction with the state of the existing
461
the Justice System Reform Council made
selection process,
462
suggestions to supplement existing expert selection methods. In 2003,
the Diet adopted reforms to the expert selection process, effective in
463
The reform
2004, based on the Reform Council recommendations.
measures adopted an alternative to traditional expert selection, an
“expert commissioner” system in which experts in technical or scientific
464
areas register to serve as experts. The purpose of this alternative is to

454. See supra note 444 and accompanying text.
455. On the issue of expert selection tied to creating “reliable and convincing
judgments,” see Otaka, supra note 439, at 5. On the issue of expert commissioner reform, see
infra text accompanying notes 461–474, as a response to the challenge presented by
technically complicated cases, see Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure, supra note 422, at
595. Regarding the issue of expert selection and legitimacy in the Germany, see supra Part
IV.D.
456. See supra text accompanying notes 402–404.
457. Feldman, supra note 414, at 270 n.41.
458. Id. at 270–71 (citations omitted).
459. Id.
460. Id.; see also GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 365 (“The [Justice System
Reform] Council was concerned that inability to obtain expert testimony was one of the
reasons for the long delay in the handling of cases requiring expertise.”).
461. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 365.
462. Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council—For a Justice System to
Support Japan in the 21st Century, 2002 ST. LOUIS–WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 119, 139–
41 (2001).
463. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 365–66; Goodman, Japan’s New Civil
Procedure, supra note 422, at 598 (describing the July 2003 reform).
464. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 366.
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“enhance the quality and accuracy of the trial proceedings.”465
Under the new system, the Supreme Court selects and maintains a
466
registry of expert commissioners willing to serve as experts. Currently,
there are around 180 experts serving as expert commissioners, each
selected “from among top-level technical experts in various scientific
fields such as leading scholars, researchers at public research institutes
467
Expert
or private corporations, patent attorneys and so on.”
468
commissioners serve part time for two-year appointments.
Under this new system, any court needing expert assistance in
litigation may appoint experts who are listed on the expert
469
commissioner registry, as an alternative to traditional procedures. The
appointed expert commissioner then assists the judge on technical
470
matters, whether by assessing the evidence, or even by active
471
Opinions
participation in the case, questioning witnesses directly.
from an expert commissioner, like any expert, must be heard by both
472
sides of the litigation and cannot be received ex parte. Beyond the use
of the expert commissioner lists by judges, private litigants may also
473
The 2003
retain list experts when seeking a private-party expert.
expert commissioner system reforms systematically responded to
problems with the old selection methodology, and have been praised as
474
a substantial success.
Japanese procedures for expert witnesses have advanced from the
traditional procedures into a more efficient system. While the expert
commissioner system is relatively new, it shows that a large nation can
attack the shortcomings of its expert system, and in so doing rebalance
legal process and scientific expertise.
465. Otaka, supra note 439, at 6.
466. Id. at 5 (citing MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 92-2 (Japan))
(purpose is to assist the court).
467. Id. at 6.
468. Id.
469. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 366–67; cf. Feldman, supra note 414, at
270–71 (noting the long delays of Japan’s system, which does not maintain an expert list for
judges).
470. Feldman, supra note 414, at 272.
471. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 365 (citing MINJI SOSH-O KISOHU
[Japanese Rules of Civil Procedure], art. 133).
472. Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure, supra note 422, at 598.
473. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 366–67.
474. Otaka, supra note 439, at 6 (finding that the expert commissioner system “has been
favorably received so far”).
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V. ASSESSMENT OF METHODOLOGIES FROM OTHER NATIONS THAT
MAY BENEFIT EXPERT WITNESS HANDLING IN THE UNITED STATES
Having reviewed expert methodologies in several nations, one can
see that balancing technological or scientific expertise and legal process
can be addressed by a variety of means. It is precisely this variety of
approaches that provides a fertile source for law reform efforts, as
Haack suggested: “Maybe we could learn something from the
experiences of other countries that are equally technologically
475
advanced, but have different regulatory and legal arrangements.”
476
The question then
Other commentators agree with her premise.
becomes: what would work here?
A. Procedures That Cannot Be Considered for Use in the United States
Initially, it is important to note that many procedures used in other
nations cannot be considered for transplantation to the U.S., whether or
not they would address weaknesses in Daubert. Examples will help
demonstrate the point.
One methodology that cannot be considered in the U.S. system is
the Canadian practice of extensive judicial comment on the evidence,
477
As allowed by Canadian law, the
including the expert opinions.
comment on evidence allows judges to state a personal opinion on the
478
While it is
strength of the evidence, ostensibly to assist the jury.
perhaps helpful to the jury to hear the judge’s viewpoints, judges in the
United States are specifically prohibited from offering opinions on
evidence, pursuant to the Judicial Code of Conduct and other ethical
479
standards.
A second expert witness management device in use elsewhere that is
inappropriate for reform in the United States is the Japanese practice of
480
In Japan, an
allowing experts to directly question witnesses.
appointed expert commissioner may assume a role beyond the limits of
an expert in the United States, so that the expert may be directly
475. Haack, supra note 17, at 23.
476. See Feldman, supra note 438, at 800; Langbein, The Influence of Comparative
Procedure, supra note 10, at 552; see also Bryan, supra note 9, at 526–31 (explaining that
advantages may come from examining foreign law and exploring Langbein’s example of the
“German Advantage”).
477. See supra text accompanying notes 281–285.
478. Vidmar, supra note 247, at 165; see also supra note 278 and accompanying text.
479. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES, Canon 3(A)(6) (2009).
480. See supra note 471 and accompanying text.

17 - JURS (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

7/9/2012 10:13 PM

BALANCING LEGAL PROCESS

1401

involved with in-court presentation of evidence including witness
481
examination. While intended to efficiently facilitate the presentation
of evidence, this expansive role exceeds the more limited role of experts
in U.S. litigation. Experts in the United States are witnesses providing
evidence, rather than parties directly involved in case management. In
addition, the questioning of witnesses is the responsibility of the
parties—through their attorneys—or in some instances, the court
482
itself. While witness examination is within the discretion of the trial
483
court, use of a witness in this way—as an advocate, not as evidence—is
484
not a procedure approved within current limits of judicial discretion.
Without specific authorization, the use of experts to question witnesses
would be an abuse of the court’s discretion.
One final procedure other countries use that could not be directly
adopted in the United States is the near-universal use of bench trials for
complex torts. In every system discussed herein, the court is usually the
485
trier of fact for complex claims. Even in those systems that permit jury
trials in civil cases—as Canada and the U.K. do for certain claims—torts
requiring extensive scientific or technical evidence are removed from
486
jury consideration. Part of the basis for removal, or assignment to the
court initially, is confidence in the judge’s ability to handle complex
487
cases that may be beyond the jury’s capacity. Yet in the United States,

481. Id.
482. The court may, under the rules of evidence, call or question witnesses. FED. R.
EVID. 614. This power is rarely exercised. Cheng, supra note 92, at 1304; Alfred Gitelson &
Bruce L. Gitelson, A Trial Judge’s Credo Must Include His Affirmative Duty to Be an
Instrumentality of Justice, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW. 7, 13–14 (1966).
483. FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
484. David P. Leonard, Appellate Review of Evidentiary Rulings, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1155,
1178 (1992) (describing the trial court methods to control questioning of witnesses to include
control of the order of evidence, permitting narrative questioning, recall of witnesses,
permitting re-direct or re-cross, or taking evidence in installments).
485. Regarding Canada, see text accompanying notes 247–248. Regarding the U.K., see
text accompanying notes 288–293. Regarding Germany, see text accompanying notes 369–
372. Regarding Japan, see text accompanying notes 429–436.
486. Even where a jury is permitted, Canadian rules permit removal of the case from the
jury due to significant complexity. See supra text accompanying note 249. In the U.K., while
jury trials may exist for certain exceptional tort cases, cases may also be removed from the
jury due to complexity. See supra text accompanying note 292.
487. In the U.K., for example, the court in Ward v. James noted that “in personal injury
cases trial by jury has given place of late to trial by judge alone, the reason being simply this,
that in these cases trial by a judge alone is more acceptable to the great majority of people.”
Ward v. James, [1966] 1 Q.B. 273, 295 (C.A.).
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the right to a jury trial in Federal court exists as a constitutional right.488
A mandatory bench trial in complex torts would therefore require
constitutional amendment overturning this long-standing right, and so
this method of expert witness management cannot be considered in the
489
United States.
B. Methodologies That Should Be Considered for Adoption in the
United States
While many methodologies of expert witness management cannot be
transplanted into the U.S. legal system, there are several that lawmakers
should consider. Each procedure discussed represents a specific change
to the current expert witness balance of legal process and scientific
expertise, to fix areas of weakness within the Daubert regime. With
these options, expert witness reform can develop not from unilateral
development of the current U.S. system, but through limited
transplantation of tested procedures already used in other major legal
systems. We need not reinvent the wheel.
1. Canadian Summary of the Evidence, and Additional Disclosures
The first example of an expert management device from another
nation that could assist expert management in the United States comes
from Canada. In Canada, at the end of a trial, the judge summarizes the
evidence, objectively stating the evidence and issues in the case for the
490
In the United States, however, we rely on the advocates to
jury.
488. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
The right of jury trial in civil cases at common law is a basic and fundamental
feature of our system of federal jurisprudence which is protected by the Seventh
Amendment. A right so fundamental and sacred to the citizen, whether guaranteed
by the Constitution or provided by statute, should be jealously guarded by the
courts.
Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752, 752–53 (1942). Empirical research demonstrates
that, as a percentage of total Federal trials for tort claims, bench trials are less prevalent now
than in the past. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 536 tbl.A-4
(2004) (finding that bench trials constituted 30% of tort trials in 1962, and 31% in 1972,
compared to 22% in 2001 and 27% in 2002).
489. See Jurs, supra note 29, at 34 (“[Congress] lacks the power to strip parties
contesting matters of private right of their constitutional right to a trial by jury.” (citing
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51–52 (1989))).
490. See supra text accompanying notes 275–280. Summation is separate from judicial
comment on the evidence, a broader privilege fundamentally inconsistent with the judicial
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summarize the evidence at the end of the case for the jury. Even so, the
idea of packaging and presenting issues offers a solution to a persistent
Daubert problem: the management of the challenges to experts at
491
“Daubert hearings.”
Consistent with the Canadian example then, we should consider
adopting mandatory summary of expert evidence for the judge to use at
a Daubert hearing, to assist the judge in deciding what are the
fundamental issues contested by the parties and the specific details of
evidence to support each party’s contention. This Article therefore
proposes a new requirement for parties to file a joint disclosure in cases
492
with contested Daubert issues. The disclosure would be completed by
both parties, not unlike a pretrial order, and must include these
materials:
•
•
•

Qualifications and background of each expert involved in the
issues contested by the motion (whether the contested expert
or the expert in response);
Delineation of the specific areas of testimony that are
contested as improper under the standard of
Daubert/Evidence Rule 702; and
For each contested issue:
o
Areas of agreement between the experts
regarding the contested issue;
o
Areas of disagreement and each party’s position
on those issues;
o
Detailed support for each expert’s opinions on
the contested issue, including all scientific and
technical bases for those opinions; and
o
Areas of scientific uncertainty with explanation
of the basis of the uncertainty and the current
493
state of research in the area.

role in the United States. See supra text accompanying notes 282–284, 477–479.
491. Regarding judicial difficulty with complex evidence, see supra Part II.D. Regarding
judicial unwillingness to utilize current tools to assist them with Daubert challenges, see supra
Part II.E.
492. This can be established by a new federal rule, or the addition of a subsection to
Federal Rule 702 solely applicable to Daubert challenges to experts.
493. These suggested disclosures are similar to the proposed changes to Rule 56
suggested by the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules in May 2008. STANDING COMM. ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE 27–32 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Reports/CV_Report.pdf. The committee suggested the change to foster well-ordered
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Upon filing of the disclosures, the court may schedule a hearing to
take testimony on the motions, or may decide the issue without further
evidence from the parties.
The expert disclosures mandated by this proposal serve several
purposes. Benefits of the procedure will be classified by the stage in
which the proceeding case receives assistance: the Daubert hearing
itself; independent expert review—if desired by the court—pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 706; jury trial; or similar challenges before
other courts.
At the first stage—the Daubert hearing—the court faces several
obstacles with the potential to affect the court’s reliability determination
on the expert evidence. Among these obstacles are the selection bias
from a litigant’s selection of outlier experts, adversarial bias from the
rigid framework imposed by cross-examination, and judicial
494
inexperience with scientific or statistical issues.
More specific disclosures, as outlined above, help address all of these
shortcomings. An outlying expert may or may not be identified as such
by the judge under the current rules, but when forced to explain in detail
the basis for each contested opinion, it becomes more likely that the
testimony can be assessed within the context of the entire scientific
495
field.
The same benefit accrues regarding the adversarial methods of
cross-examination. With cross-examination, a party has the ability to
cast doubt—merited or otherwise—on the expert’s position, while
empirical evidence demonstrates that experts sometimes respond by

and concise motions in this area. Id. at 25. However, after the comment period, the
Committee decided to shelve the procedure, as not required as a mandatory requirement for
all cases. STANDING COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE
CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 7 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Supreme%20Court%202009/Excerpt-CV.pdf.
In the context of
Daubert and contested expert testimony, the disclosures would serve an appropriate purpose.
See infra text accompanying notes 495–505.
494. Regarding selection bias, see supra Part II.B. Regarding adversarial methods and
bias, see supra Part II.C. Regarding judicial difficulty with complex evidence, see supra Part
II.D.
495. This is not to say it will necessarily be excluded as unreliable, then, depending on
the infirmity of the position and whether it can be defended. As Justice Blackmun stated in
Daubert, the appropriate response to weak expert evidence is not exclusion, but vigorous
cross-examination. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (citing
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)).
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expressing their opinions more unconditionally.496 Yet, if the issues are
clearly delineated by the parties in the new disclosures, the judge should
be better able to determine which cross-examination questions serve to
cast genuine doubt upon the merits of the expert opinion, and which do
not.
Finally, the disclosures assist in addressing the judiciary’s general
inexperience with complex science or mathematics. The judge in a
Daubert hearing must determine scientific reliability, and that role has
been described as “daunting” or requiring judges to become “amateur
497
Inexperience with science or statistics compounds the
scientists.”
problem, as inexperienced judges may not be able to critically assess
498
With
methodological weaknesses within an expert’s argument.
additional disclosures, the court has a clear record of the disputed issues
and the basis for each, and it becomes easier for the judge to apply the
499
reliability test under Daubert to the evidence in the individual case.
Even with disclosures, however, some reliability issues will test the
skills of even the most scientifically-capable juror. The disclosures
suggested here have an additional benefit for these cases; the disclosures
permit a quicker, more efficient review by an independent expert
500
While
appointed by the court under Federal Rule of Evidence 706.
judges see independent review as beneficial, many are reluctant to
appoint a Rule 706 expert. Two reasons for this reluctance are judicial
concerns about interfering with adversarial process and potential case
501
The benefit of additional disclosures eliminates these two
delay.
reasons not to appoint a Rule 706 expert.
First, while in general adversarial norms are used in the American
system, in the cases mandating these disclosures, the use of these norms
can potentially affect validity of outcomes. The disclosures suggested
here involve delineation of disagreement, the end game of the partisan
496. See supra text accompanying notes 65–83.
497. See supra text accompanying notes 21–28.
498. See supra text accompanying note 114; Robbennolt, supra note 114, at 797.
499. Note that the judge is seeking to review the methodological soundness, the
“reliability” of the science, under Daubert, to ensure the expert uses the “same level of
intellectual rigor” in the courtroom as in the laboratory. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137, 152 (1999). However the judge makes this decision within the wide range of
discretion afforded to a trial judge on evidentiary issues. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136, 143 (1997).
500. Regarding the power of a court to appoint an independent expert, see supra Part
II.E.2.
501. See supra text accompanying notes 173–174.
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management of the case, and afterward a non-adversarial framework
may assist to assure reliability reflects scientific theory on the issue.
Second, disclosures reduce the concern over the delay in appointment of
an independent expert, as the disclosures highlight the exact issues in
play, and the basis for each position. Any independent expert
appointed by the judge would have a pre-packaged set of contested
issues to allow for expeditious review. Disclosures enhance the ability
of judges to use the independent expert rule in a greater number of
cases.
So far, the focus has been on benefits at the Daubert hearing stage or
for independent expert review, but the disclosures suggested here would
also assist at the trial stage. At the Daubert hearing, the court has to
determine whether the expert opinion is reliable enough for admission
under Rule 702. Should the opinion be unreliable, the court precludes
the expert from testifying. In many cases, however, the result of the
hearing will be that the contested expert’s opinion is deemed “reliable
502
enough,” and admitted. For those cases, then, the contested expert—
and a counterpart from the opposing party or parties—will testify at trial
for the jury. Yet, we know jurors may have the same difficulties in
503
To the extent the reliability
assessing complex evidence as judges.
issue remains an issue at trial, then the disclosures can also assist the
jury. Therefore, the disclosures submitted by the parties to the judge for
the Daubert stage also should be admissible at trial, on motion of the
parties or the judge sua sponte, when “good cause” has been shown.
The disclosures will assist the jury to decide the contested expert
504
reliability just as the disclosures helped the judge at the earlier stage.
Use by the jury, after all, is the original purpose of summary on the
505
evidence used in Canada, and in this form offers the same benefit.
The disclosures suggested here would have one final systematic
benefit: they specifically delineate the state of the science on an issue at
the time of the decision. Case opinions discussing complex science often

502. Regarding the standard for admission of testimony at a Daubert hearing, see supra
note 497.
503. See supra Part II.D.1.
504. Of course, the judge reviewed the disclosures under a different standard, but there
is no reason to think the differing burden would affect the validity of the disclosures at this
stage.
505. Again, this is to differentiate between the summary of the evidence, see supra notes
276–280 and accompanying text, and the judicial comment on the evidence, see supra notes
281–285.

17 - JURS (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

7/9/2012 10:13 PM

BALANCING LEGAL PROCESS

1407

serves as persuasive authority for other judges reviewing the same
506
Of course, scientific knowledge in a given field constantly
issue.
507
changes. To the extent that any other court addresses the same issue,
and considers the older opinion as precedent, the court will know
exactly what evidence was presented in the previous case and served as
a basis for the opinion. Knowing the evidentiary basis for the prior
opinion permits the later judge to establish what evidence in his or her
hearing was not considered before, and merits particular attention in
that Daubert review. The litigants also could note the changes in the
state of scientific knowledge since the prior precedent, arguing for
differing treatment based on the new science mandates.
The additional requirement of disclosures at the Daubert stage,
based on Canadian procedure of judicial summary, rebalances the
current procedures used on the issue of expert witnesses in Federal
court. But because of the significant benefits of the procedure, changing
those procedures seems well worth it.
2. Civil Law Expert Selection Methods
A second example of a procedure based on one used abroad that
could assist expert management in the United States originates in
procedures used in Japan and Germany. In those countries, the judge
selects an expert to assist the judge to decide contested issues of
508
The
evidence, and sometimes for case management in Japan.
selection and role of the expert in these civil law systems contrasts
509
significantly with the party-led expert practices in the United States.
Yet aspects of the civil law expert selection procedures would offer
benefits to U.S. expert management.

506. Wendy E. Wagner, Ethyl: Bridging the Science–Law Divide, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1291,
1293 (1996).
507. Regarding the scientific method in general, and its methodology of analysis and reexamination of previously held truths, see Haack, supra note 17, at 7–15 (suggesting that
“scientific inquiry takes the time it takes, and its progress is ragged and unpredictable”; that
“scientific inquiry is by nature tentative and thoroughly fallibilist”; and that “there is always,
at least in principle, the possibility of having to go back and start over on what had been
thought to be settled questions” (emphasis omitted)); and Sanders, Science, Law, and Expert
Witness, supra note 68, at 70–73 (noting that scientific inquiry lacks a timetable; “the law’s
need for relatively prompt closure stands in direct conflict with the scientific convention that
closure should only occur when a consensus forms, however long that might be”).
508. Regarding expert selection procedures in Germany, see supra Part IV.D.2.
Regarding expert selection procedures in Japan, see supra text accompanying notes 461–474.
509. The use of experts in U.S. litigation is discussed supra Part II.
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Because the expert selected by a judge in Germany or Japan will
serve as the single neutral expert in the case, those nations place great
emphasis on the fairness of the expert selection procedures, so that trials
510
As a result, these civil law systems have
maintain legitimacy.
developed procedures to ensure that the single expert selected is
suitable to serve by having recognized skills in the scientific field, but
511
also by agreeing to neutral and detached assessment of the facts.
Japan and Germany ensure experts will be vetted prior to the specific
litigation in question, so that they may serve when needed by a judge in
512
In some instances, the relevant professional society
future cases.
selects those members who wish to and who are well-qualified to
513
serve. By these methodologies, the person will be seen as fair, or at
least fair enough, to assist the judge.
Since the U.S. courts lack systematic procedures to identify or vet
experts prior to specific litigation, almost all expert selection is
514
adversarial and inherently subject to selection bias and other ills. Very
few experts can convincingly demonstrate their inherent fairness and
neutrality to the level that civil law experts can due to their selection
procedures. This Article therefore proposes a new system, established
through the federal judiciary, to identify experts both well-qualified in
their field and dedicated to the principle of fair assessment of evidence.
The selection process would be modeled on the systems of both
Japan and Germany. As in Germany, for those experts who are licensed
and regulated by an administrative governing body—doctors, architects,
lawyers, dentists, etc.—the proposal amounts to allowing that governing
body to determine appropriate qualifications, and identify those experts
515
who meet high standards for skill and ethics. All decisions of that selfgoverning body would be subject to oversight by the administrative
body responsible for establishing lists for other expert areas. For all
510. Regarding the association of expert selection to legitimacy in Germany, see supra
text accompanying note 400, and in Japan, see supra text accompanying note 455.
511. Regarding expert selection in Germany, see supra Part IV.D.2. Regarding expert
selection in Japan, see supra text accompanying notes 461–474.
512. With few limits, any expert on the list may be used by the German judge. See supra
notes 402–404 and accompanying text. Japan adopted a similar approach in the 2004 reforms.
See supra note 467 and accompanying text.
513. Professional associations have significant involvement in expert selection in
Germany. See supra text accompanying note 403.
514. See supra Part II.B (describing a selection bias); Part II.C (describing an adversarial
bias).
515. See supra text accompanying note 402.
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other experts not self-regulated—epidemiologists, some engineers,
college professors—the expertise and qualifications of individuals would
be vetted through a central administrative body maintained within the
office of the U.S. Courts, governed by regulations adopted to ensure
selected experts demonstrate both skill in their field and dedication to
516
ethical assessment of the evidence in assigned cases.
Once selected, the experts from the lists will be available to serve in
two separate situations. First, the experts may be called to serve as
517
Any
independent experts by judges under Rule of Evidence 706.
judge wishing to have expert review of a specific issue of expertise,
whether for a Daubert hearing or not, would have access to appropriate
518
experts pre-screened for quality. Independent of the use of experts by
the judiciary under Rule 706, any listed expert could be retained by a
519
litigant as his or her expert in the litigation.
The identification of experts through a civil-law screening process
provides several important benefits, each addressing a current weakness
in the Daubert management of experts. First, the identification of
skilled neutral experts enables judges to quickly find and retain experts
who can assist them in reviewing contested scientific or technical
evidence. Empirical evidence demonstrates judges themselves may lack
520
necessary skills to evaluate complex science in the courtroom, with the
potential to effect reliability assessments in cases involving complex
521
The use of independent experts under Rule 706 provides
science.
judges with a skilled assistant to help the judge in evaluating the
522
It also
litigant’s expert in reliability determinations under Daubert.
exposes those attacks on litigants’ experts that are pro forma adversarial
516. Regarding the selection of non-professional experts in Germany, see text
accompanying note 400. Regarding the selection of expert commissioners in Japan, see text
accompanying notes 466–469.
517. Regarding judicial power to appoint independent experts, see supra Part II.E.2.
518. With the procedures discussed supra Part V.B.1, the issues for review by an
independent expert are likely to be delineated for quicker, more efficient review.
519. Regarding experts and party control, see supra text accompanying note 469
(suggesting that experts on the expert commissioner list may be retained by private litigants);
see also text accompanying note 394–395 (describing the appointment of second expert in
German litigation after request of a party).
520. See supra Part II.D.1 (discussing empirical research on judicial training in science
and mathematics).
521. See supra notes 91, 114 and accompanying text.
522. See supra notes 150–154 and accompanying text. For an example of a trained
economist assisting a judge in litigation, see United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953) (describing a situation where an economist assisted a judge).
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tactics, and those that actually expose weaknesses in the science
523
Yet the Rule has, since its inception, been
discussed by the expert.
524
used sparingly.
A list of available and appropriate experts neutralizes two of the
major reasons why judges do not currently use Rule 706 procedures:
525
delay, and inability to identify a qualified expert. If an expert could
easily be called to serve, and that expert has been pre-screened for skills
and fairness, then the judge need not worry about the unnecessary delay
of vetting many candidates nor worry about the skills of the expert. As
a result, the expert lists proposed here would reinvigorate the Rule 706
neutral expert review procedure, allowing judges to seek help more
often in cases involving complex science.
Independent of the benefit to the judge, expert lists identified
through a civil-law screening procedure have separate benefits to the
litigants stemming from the ability to use experts from the list as their
526
Since the lists would be available for
party-expert in the litigation.
anyone, the experts identified through these procedures would provide
litigants with a pre-approved list of experts, who a jury would likely
consider fair. Any party could decide that the benefit of choosing an
expert from the list—blunting attacks based on payment of fees or on
non-neutrality—exceed the benefits of choosing an expert using
adversarial techniques but who may be subject to those attacks. Over
time, experts retained by litigants would have to blunt partisan overreaching, because experts who overreach or who are inappropriate
outliers in the field will be exposed as the non-neutral adversarial
527
experts they are. In doing so, the focus can again shift from persuasion
528
to the scientific merit of the testimony.

523. Regarding the use of adversarial methods to create doubt about an opposing
expert, see Part II.C and specifically text accompanying note 155.
524. See supra text accompanying notes 159–162 (concluding that the Cecil & Willging
study shows only 20% of federal judges ever appointed a Rule 706 expert); see also supra note
165–167 and accompanying text (finding that the study results from Krafka were similar).
525. See supra text accompanying notes 172–174 (explanation of judicial unwillingness to
appoint independent experts by Cecil & Willging, Cheng, and Robertson).
526. Regarding the use of experts by litigants in a civil law nation, see supra notes 470,
516 and accompanying text (discussing private litigants retaining experts using similar
method).
527. See supra text accompanying notes 151–156.
528. Per Justice Breyer, the Daubert system intended to ensure that experts use the
same intellectual rigor in the courtroom as in the laboratory. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
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Finally, one other benefit of the proposed procedure is the
maintenance of the general balance of power within our adversarial
system. Neutral experts and additional use of the Rule 706 expert
procedure may assist the judge in the performance of his or her duties,
and assist in encouraging outcomes that reflect accurate scientific
methodologies. The neutral expert procedure so described does not,
however, take the decisionmaking authority away from those who
already have that power: the judge and the jury. Even if a judge chooses
to retain an independent expert, the parties maintain the right to present
their evidence as they see fit, subject only to increased scrutiny from one
529
who may see the weaknesses in the scientific method used.
Furthermore, an independent expert does not remove the final authority
530
to decide from the jury. Therefore, the balance of legal process and
scientific expertise is not subject to radical and unsupported shifts
531
inconsistent with our nation’s legal norms.
Even with these benefits, the proposal likely will face critical
responses. Two important counter-arguments will be reviewed here:
first, judges will remain reluctant to appoint an independent expert even
with the proposed system, and second, that the proposal may be
doomed in light of the experiences of the Court Appointed Scientific
Experts (“CASE”) program of the early 2000’s.
Some critics may suggest that even if experts have been identified
through the procedures as proposed, judges still will not appoint experts
532
under Rule 706. Current research does show that judges are reluctant
to proceed with independent experts, and that adversarial norms may
533
play a part in that reluctance. There are two arguments in response.
First, to the extent that the critics suggest that the structure of the

529. This is in contrast to the methodology in civil law systems where the judge
maintains a level of control inconsistent with current American judicial procedures. See supra
text accompanying notes 369–374 (Germany), 426–431 (Japan).
530. See supra note 488 and accompanying text.
531. This is consistent with Robertson’s argument that “[t]o date, the litigation system
has not yet found a way to provide factfinders with reliable and unbiased expert signals while
still leaving the development of cases in the hands of self-interested litigants.” Robertson,
supra note 39, at 179.
532. This argument would be based on the studies discussed supra Part II.E.2
(identifying reasons judges are reluctant to appoint Rule 706 experts).
533. See supra Part II.E.2, text accompanying notes 160–172; see also Deason, supra note
36, at 78 & n.82 (noting that the use of court-appointed experts is described as rare, and
discussing research on the frequency of these appointments).
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American system is inconsistent with any inquisitorial procedures,534 the
current proposal suggests reforms that merely remove barriers to use of
existing procedures, namely Rule 706. If Rule 706 experts are not
appointed because of concerns over delay and to the difficulties of
535
identifying an expert, as research suggests, then overcoming those
concerns provides incentives to follow existing procedures. This change
is not an inquisitorial usurpation of roles as much as a realization that
current case management tools need to be updated to be effective. In
addition, to the extent the issue is based in defense of adversarial norms
for their own sake, the first point regarding the managerial role of
judges remains valid. In addition, Langbein and others see the
adversarial norms argument as merely rejecting other approaches
536
If the solution
“because we are Americans and they are Germans.”
solves a problem in the U.S. system, then this argument seems a weak
counterpoint.
Second, commentators like Cheng have suggested a broad-based
change in the willingness of litigants to accept a “managerial judge” role,
which allows “a greater degree of inquisitorial thinking, opening the
door to institutions like court-appointed experts and scientific
537
tribunals.” If that shift is occurring, then the adoption of inquisitorial
norms may offer hope “to correct the excesses associated with our
538
current adversarial framework.”
Third, changes in common law procedures have been known to
occur even in the least restrictive systems. In England, for example, the
Civil Procedure Rules explicitly permit the court to mandate the use of a
539
single expert in cases. While currently used mainly in routine matters,
the potential exists for nonadversarial procedures even in the most
540
complex tort claims under that rule. If England has adopted reforms
that can remove adversarial control of experts, then that the United
States might consider it as well.
534. Erichson, supra note 380, at 2006–15, 2023–24 (comparing and contrasting the
inquisitorial method of litigation with the adversarial method; assessing barriers to common
law adoption of civil law methodologies).
535. See supra text accompanying notes 170–174 (citing research and commentary by
Cecil & Willging, Cheng, and Robertson).
536. Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism, supra note 202, at 45.
537. Cheng, supra note 8, at 1401–02.
538. Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and
the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1274 (2005).
539. CIV. PROC. R. 35.7 (Eng.).
540. See supra text accompanying notes 336–337.
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Even if one were to reject the adversarial norm argument, an
additional criticism of the proposal remains and must be addressed: the
CASE project, and what it suggests about the workability of this
proposal. Established in 1998, CASE was an effort by the American
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) to promote the
use of independent experts, by selecting experts for a judge to use on a
541
case-by-case basis. Before accepting requests from judges in 2001, the
CASE program received endorsement by Justice Breyer in Joiner, and
542
Even with these endorsements, the
the House Science Committee.
results from CASE are mixed. Individual judges who have used the
543
However, when CASE becomes
program attest to its helpfulness.
involved in a case, the result is often an end to the litigation by quick
544
As a result, the CASE project was, by late 2008, “no
settlement.
longer being marketed, ha[d] not received any requests for experts
545
The inability of
recently, and never achieved [a] high level of use.”
CASE to gain momentum suggests that the current proposal might
result in similar problems.
There are several reasons to think that the current proposal based
on civil law methodologies would gain greater momentum than the
CASE project. One major difference between CASE and this proposal
is who can take advantage of the program. The CASE program was
546
built to assist solely judges requesting experts. With this proposal, the
system allows judges to find a neutral expert, but also provides

541. Court Appointed Scientific Experts, CASE Mainpage, AAAS, http://www.aaas.
org/spp/case/case.htm (last visited June 6, 2012) [hereinafter CASE Mainpage] (“CASE staff
selects experts on a case-by-case basis, tailoring the search to the specific request for
assistance.”); see also Cheng, supra note 8, at 1396, 1400 (noting the CASE program, but
suggesting it “faces an uphill battle,” considering its opposition); Timmerbeil, supra note 218,
at 171–72 (noting the CASE process and suggesting the problem remains in the decision to
appoint any expert and not with selection of the expert). Experts were selected by a
Recruitment and Screening Panel with members including scientists, physicians, and
engineers.
CASE Recruitment and Screening Panel, AAAS, http://www.aaas.org/
spp/case/panel.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
542. 522 U.S. 136, 149–50 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring); CASE Mainpage, supra note
541.
543. CASE Experience, AAAS, http://www.aaas.org/spp/case/experience.htm (last
visited Apr. 14, 2012).
544. Haack, supra note 17, at 21 & n.104 (recounting a personal recollection of Dr. Mark
Frankel, CASE Director).
545. Robertson, supra note 39, at 201 n.138 (citing E-mail from Deborah Runkle, CASE
Project Manager (Dec. 19, 2008)).
546. See CASE Experience, supra note 543.
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programmatic assistance to private litigants retaining party experts.547
As a result, the program has a broader base of support, benefits more
actors within the legal system, and is likely to be used by litigants at
548
stage of a contested Daubert hearing but also earlier in the process.
A second difference between proposals is how experts are identified.
In CASE, the committees would vet experts only after a judge’s request
549
for an expert in that field. Because of these procedures, CASE did not
have standing expert pools or handle general inquiries about expert
assistance. Under this proposal, however, experts would be screened
independent of a specific case in controversy, based on pre-determined
procedures set by federal regulations written to promote quality
550
experts. Not only does this ensure broad consistency in assessment of
expert candidates, it also ensures that any judge or litigant can find a
Rule 706 expert with little delay. As a result, the program would
enhance the profile of the independent expert rule, and make it more
easily used.
A third difference between CASE and this proposal is institutional
backing. The CASE project was developed and supported by the
551
AAAS, a private non-profit with approximately 120,000 members.
The CASE project largely depended on AAAS members and other
people committed to the goals of the project and serving on committees.
In this proposal, however, the expert management system becomes a
responsibility and duty of the administrative office of the U.S. courts,
552
The difference in
with full support of the federal government.
institutional backing provides additional funding, a high profile, and
consistent levels of use over time, responding to the weaknesses of the
institutionally weaker CASE program.
Finally, the proposal presented here has one additional benefit: it
can learn from the CASE project. The CASE project began accepting
judicial requests in 2001, and took requests for many years. During that

547. See supra text accompanying notes 510–512.
548. This is consistent with Robertson’s argument that any CASE-type program be
targeted at litigants in addition to judges. Robertson, supra note 39, at 201 n.138.
549. See supra text accompanying notes 542, 546; see also Seidemann et al., supra note
58, at 60–61.
550. See supra text accompanying notes 515–516.
551. About AAAS: What Is AAAS?, AAAS, http://www.aaas.org//aboutaaas/organiza
tion/index.shtml (last visited June 6, 2012).
552. See supra text accompanying note 516; see also Seidemann et al., supra note 58, at
69 (suggesting that federal backing is essential to the success of any program like CASE).
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time, the committees developed guidelines for expert review. As a
result, the managers for the new system should actively solicit the
assistance of experienced CASE committee members to assist in the
development of the new administrative framework.
With several significant advantages over the previous CASE
program, the current proposal benefits from CASE’s prior attempt to
manage expert witnesses, while incorporating changes to structure that
suggest this proposal would have greater long-term viability.
Adoption of a civil-law expert management system modeled on the
Japanese and German systems would provide benefits in overcoming
current problems with Daubert-era expert management in the United
States. The current proposal offers significant advantages over previous
attempts to manage neutral experts. It also demonstrates that, at least in
the area of expert witnesses, the U.S. can and should consider
alternative methodologies developed in other nations, if those
methodologies are shown to offer advantages over the current system.
VI. CONCLUSION
Balancing legal due process with technological or scientific expertise
is a problem that has generated significant controversy and commentary
within the United States. A good starting point to address these
problems is to acknowledge that the concerns with experts occur not
only within our system but by other nations with a variety of legal
systems. In doing so, we recognize that the problems of Daubert are
difficult, but not insurmountable, so long as we approach them with an
open mind, an exploring spirit, and desire to improve results. This kind
of approach was suggested by Susan Haack in her article Irreconcilable
553
Differences? The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law in 2009, and
has been followed here.
By reviewing the weaknesses in Daubert assessment of complex
expert testimony in complex tort cases, how other nations handle similar
evidence, and how certain discrete areas of foreign law could address
the weaknesses identified in the U.S. approach, this Article has offered
reforms to help judges in balancing the need for accuracy and reliability
of the science presented in court with maintaining our necessary
traditions of legal process.

553. Haack, supra note 17, at 23.

